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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The following issues are presented to this Court for review: 
ISSUE NO. 1: Did the district court correctly rule that the broken asphalt which 
caused plaintiff to trip was a "temporary" condition for which she had the burden to show 
that defendant had notice of and an opportunity to cure in order to assert a prima facie 
case of negligence? 
Preservation: This issue was preserved in the defendants' motion for summary judgment 
and accompanying memorandum (R. 58-136), plaintiffs opposition to motion for summary 
judgment (R. 320-402, 410-492), and defendants' reply memorandum in further support of 
motion for summary judgment (R. 506-514). 
Standard of Review: Trial court's legal conclusions in granting summary judgment are 
reviewed for correctness. Smith v. Four Corners Mental Health Ctr., Inc., 2003 UT 23, f^ 
13,70P.3d904. 
ISSUE NO. 2: Did the district court err in ruling that there were no factual issues 
to support plaintiffs argument that defendant had notice or that constructive notice could 
be inferred or that the condition had existed for some period of time due to plaintiffs 
"wholesale failure" to properly controvert the facts as required by Rule 7(c)(3)(B) and the 
undisputed evidence could not support an inference of constructive notice? 
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Preservation: This issue was preserved in the defendants' motion for summary judgment 
and accompanying memorandum (R. 58-136), plaintiffs opposition to motion for summary 
judgment (R. 320-402, 410-492), and defendants' reply memorandum in further support of 
motion for summary judgment (R. 506-514). 
Standard of Review: A district court's determination to admit as uncontroverted the 
facts submitted by an opposing party in support of a motion for summary judgment which 
were not specifically controverted is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard of 
review. Gary Porter Construction v. Fox Construction, 2004 UT App 354, Tf 10, 101 
P.3d 371, cert, denied 123 P.3d 815. 
The court's further holding that plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence to 
survive summary judgment is reviewed for correctness. Jex v. JRA, Inc., 2007 UT 249, ^ 
8, 166 P.3d 655, citing Jackson v. Mateus, 2003 UT 18, ^  6. "Although upon summary 
judgment the court must view all facts and inferences in favor of the non moving party, it 
may not assume facts for which no evidence is offered." Peterson v. Coca-Cola USA, 
2002 UT 42, \ 20, 48 P.3d 941. When a moving party has presented sufficient evidence 
to support the claim for judgment as a matter of law, and the opposing party fails to meet 
its burden to provide some evidence creating an issue of material fact, the trial court is 
justified in concluding that no genuine issue of fact is present or would be at trial. Arnica 
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 957 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) citing Dupler v. Yates, 
351 P.2d 624, 636-37 (Utah 1960). 
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ISSUE NO. 3: Did the district court correctly rule that the Release signed by 
plaintiff unambiguously barred her negligence claim against defendant Gold's Gym for 
injuries sustained in the parking lot? 
Preservation: This issue was preserved in the defendants' motion for summary judgment 
and accompanying memorandum (R. 58-136), plaintiffs opposition to motion for summary 
judgment (R. 320-402, 410-492), and defendants' reply memorandum in further support of 
motion for summary judgment (R. 506-514). 
Standard of Review: A district court's decision to grant summary judgment is reviewed 
for correctness. Jex v. JRA, Inc., 2007 UT 249, \ 8 citing Jackson v. Mateus, 2003 UT 
18, Tf 6. The "facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom are examined in the 
light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. Ewart, 2007 
UT52,TJ2, 167 P.3d 1011. 
ISSUE NO. 4: Did the district court commit reversible error in striking plaintiffs 
designation of "Clay" and Leslie Thornton as experts despite her concession not to call 
them as experts and striking David Jenkins as an expert witness for her failure to comply 
with Rule 26 by not providing a report, or any of the other information required by the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure? And did the district court commit reversible error in 
striking photographs which were first produced as attachments to plaintiffs motion to 
reconsider? 
Preservation: This issue was addressed in defendants' motion and memorandum to 
strike plaintiff s designation of expert witnesses (R. 152-173), defendants' motion and 
memorandum to strike plaintiffs photographs (R. 639-640640 and 650-686), plaintiffs 
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response to motion to strike designation of expert witnesses (R. 287-291), plaintiffs 
response to motion to strike designation photographs (R. 702-705), and defendants' 
motion and memorandum in support of Rule 37 motion to compel (R. 174-209). 
Standard of Review: A district court's evidentiary rulings striking plaintiffs expert 
witness designation and photographs are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. 
American Interstate Mortg. Corp. v. Edwards, 2002 UT App 16, | | 10, 22, 41 P.3d 
1142. 
ISSUE NO. 4: Did the district court commit reversible error in denying plaintiffs 
motion for reconsideration? 
Preservation: This issue was addressed in plaintiffs motion and memorandum for 
reconsideration of order granting summary judgment (R 545-632), defendants' '?t 
memorandum in opposition to plaintiffs motion for reconsideration (R.641-649), and 
plaintiffs reply in support of motion for reconsideration (R. 687-695). 
Standard of Review: Motions to reconsider are not recognized by the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. Gillett v. Price, 2006 UT 24, fflf 5, 7-8, 135 P.3d 861. "Because trial 
courts are under no obligation to consider motions for reconsideration, any decision to 
address or not to address the merits of such a motion is highly discretionary." Tschaggeny 
v. Milbanklns. Co., 2007 UT 37, *{ 15, 163 P.3d 615. The trial court's ruling may not be 
overturned unless "there is no reasonable basis for the decision." Langeland v. Monarch 
Motors, 952 P.2d 1058, 1061 (Utah 1998) (citations omitted). As the order granting 
summary judgment had not been entered prior to the filing of the motion for 
reconsideration, Johnson's motion for reconsideration was simply reargument of her 
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opposition to the motion for summary judgment which the trial court was free to entertain 
at any point prior to entry of the summary judgment. Ron Shepherd Ins. v. Shields, 882 
P.2d 650 (Utah 1994). 
ISSUE NO. 5: Did the district court have jurisdiction to decide the motion for 
summary judgment when the matter was transferred to Judge Mortensen in American 
Fork from Provo by Judge Howard who had recused himself to avoid the appearance of a 
conflict? 
Preservation: Appellee's believe Johnson waived any contention related to the Order of 
Recusal, Reassignment, and Transfer entered on May 15, 2007, by failing to raise any 
opposition in any of the many pleadings she filed with Judge Mortensen in American 
Fork including her opposition to the motion for summary judgment during the 5 months 
the case was pending until after summary judgment was entered against her. This issue 
was first raised in Johnson's motion for reconsideration of the motion for summary 
judgment and therefore was not preserved for appeal. (R 545-632). 
Standard of Review: "[C]laims not raised before the trial court may not be raised on 
appeal." State v. Cram, 2002 UT 37, 1 9, 46 P.3d 230 {quoting State v. Holgate, 2000 
UT 74, ]f 11, 10 P.3d 346). An issue not preserved for appeal will not be reviewed on 
appeal absent plain error or exceptional circumstances. State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4, J^ 
14, 128 P.3d 1171. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a premises liability action wherein Nelda P. Johnson ("Johnson") claims to 
have tripped and fallen on broken asphalt in the parking lot a few steps from the front 
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door of Gold's Gym at 470 North and 900 East in Provo, Utah on or about July 12, 2004. 
The landowner, Peay Investment Company, had leased the subject property to Gold's 
Gym since February 1995. 
On April 13, 2005, Johnson filed her complaint alleging that Gold's Gym and 
Peay Investment Company (hereinafter jointly referred to as "Gold's") were negligent in 
maintaining the parking lot. After the close of fact discovery on January 30, 2007, and 
after Johnson designated her experts on February 28, 2007, Gold's moved for summary 
judgment on April 4, 2007, asserting that Johnson had failed to show that Gold's had 
either actual or constructive notice of the defect in the asphalt that caused her to fall and 
an opportunity to repair the defect before Johnson's fall and that, even if she were able to 
produce such evidence, Johnson had released Gold's Gym from liability when she signed 
the Contract upon becoming a member of the gym. 
Three months later, on June 29, 2007, Johnson filed her memorandum opposing 
the motion. Therein, Johnson failed to controvert the facts set forth in the motion for 
summary judgment. Instead, Johnson rested upon her unsupported denials of the 
undisputed testimony that Gold's performed daily inspections of the parking lot and had 
no notice of any defect in the parking lot, bald assertions that her demand for monetary 
compensation she sent to Gold's after her fall as well as other events occurring after her 
fall could support an inference of constructive notice prior to her fall, and pure 
speculation regarding when the condition may have occurred. 
Thereafter, in a memorandum decision, the district court granted summary 
judgment in favor of Gold's having determined as a matter of law that the broken asphalt 
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which Johnson contended caused her to trip was a condition for which, in order to 
maintain her claim for negligence, Johnson would have to be able to show notice and an 
opportunity to cure and that there were no genuine issues of material fact to permit the 
case to go to a jury where Johnson had not shown or produced any evidence that Gold's 
knew or should have known of the broken asphalt, let alone had time to fix it. 
Additionally, the district court held that Johnson released Gold's from ordinary 
negligence liability for the injuries she sustained in the parking lot when she signed the 
Assumption of Risk and Risk of Accident Release. 
Thereafter, Johnson filed a motion for reconsideration to which she attached her 
own declaration as well as photographs. Some of those photographs had not been 
produced despite having been subject to an order to compel that had been previously 
granted. The district court denied the motion, finding that it "lack[ed] merif' where 
Johnson was simply rearguing her case and presenting "new evidence for which 
[Johnson] gives no reason could not have been presented" before. Further, it found that 
"[t]o some extent [Johnson] is attempting to supplement the record, perhaps hoping the 
appellate court will not be able to make a distinction between the record before the trial 
court at the time summary judgment was granted and evidence or arguments presented 
subsequent to the memorandum decision." The district court further explained that "[i]t 
does not advance the interests of justice or the efficiency of the courts to essentially allow 
parties to reargue or represent matters to the court when significant time has already been 
expended.. .This concern is even more egregious in this case where the plaintiff party had 
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such an exceptionally long extension in which to respond to the motion for summary 
judgment." 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS1 
L On April 13, 2005, Johnson filed her complaint. (R. 1- 4). 
2. Pursuant to the Scheduling Order, which was proposed and drafted by 
Johnson: (1) fact discovery was to be completed by November 15, 2006; and (2) Johnson 
was to identify experts and produce expert reports pursuant to Rule 26(a)(3)(C) on 
December 15, 2006, 30 days from the completion of fact discovery and "expert witness 
discovery shall be completed by February 15, 2007." (R. 21-23). 
3. On or about June 20,2006, Johnson identified her daughter Jocelyn Vance, 
son-in-law Justin Vance, and son S. Andrew Johnson as "all persons known or believed 
to have witnessed" her fall. 
4. On or about December 7, 2006, more than 1 year and 7 months after filing 
her complaint, Johnson served her first set of discovery on Gold's Gym. 
5. Earlier that same day, Gold's had agreed to give Johnson an extension to 
conduct fact discovery until January 30, 2007. (R. 120). 
6. Thereafter, on or about December 11, 2006, Johnson filed an exact 
duplicate set of interrogatories on Peay Investment. 
7. Gold's Gym filed its response to Johnson's interrogatories on January 19, 
2007. (R. 43-44). 
1
 Repeat insinuations that Gold's "failed to" or "finally" provided discovery necessitated 
this clarification of the procedural history. 
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8. At 3:30 p.m. on Friday, January 26, 2007 (four calendar days before the 
expiration of the extended fact discovery deadline) without any previous contact with 
counsel, Gold's received Johnson's facsimile notice of her intent to depose Robert Peay, 
Nate Loftin, Lisa Felsted, and Candy Negrette, the following Tuesday, January 30, 2007, 
as well as a notice of intent to depose "Head of Gold (sic) Gym" on February 1, 2007. 
Although Johnson only provided Gold's with effectively two business days notice, 
Gold's made every effort to accommodate Johnson's discovery demands and informed 
Johnson that Troy Peterson, Nate Loftin, Lisa Felsted, and Kandi Negrete, could be 
available on Thursday, February 1, 2007. Gold's could not make Robert Peay available 
as he was deceased. (R. 122). 
9. On January 30, 2007, Johnson amended her Notice of Depositions for Nate 
Loftin, Candy Negrette and Lynette Felstead for February 1, 2007. (Exhibit A) 
10. Johnson did not amend her Notice of Deposition for deposing Robert Peay 
and did not notice up a 30(b)(6) deposition of Peay Investment Company. In her 
February 20, 2007 letter, Johnson indicated that her discovery requests from Peay 
Investment Company would be satisfied once Peay responded to her interrogatories and 
requests for production of documents, stating that once this was received she would be 
ready "to go forward to trial." (R. 128). 
11. Peay Investment Company filed its Response to Plaintiffs First Set of 
Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents on March 5, 2007.2 
Johnson contends that Peay's answers to her interrogatories were untimely. It is true 
that Peay's discovery responses should have been filed within thirty days, but were not. 
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12. Following the depositions on February 1, 2007, Johnson assured Gold's 
that she would provide her expert reports within the next 10 days. (R. 125). 
13. Instead, however, in a letter dated February 20, 2007, Johnson informed 
Gold's that she would identify experts by February 28, 2007, 30 days after the end of fact 
discovery. (R. 128-129). 
14. On or about February 28, 2007, Johnson filed her Designation of Expert 
Witnesses which consisted solely of providing the name (and in one instance, just the 
first name "Clay" without a surname) and contact information of 5 individuals and a 
vague description of the subject matter on which those experts might opine. No written 
reports or other required information was provided. (R. 47- 49). 
15. In a March 5, 2007 letter, Gold's requested that Johnson provide the expert 
reports as required under the rules no later than March 18, 2007. (R. 131- 132). 
16. On March 13, 2007, Gold's agreed to give Johnson one last extension to 
provide her expert reports on or before March 21, 2007. (R. 134). 
17. On March 21, 2007, Johnson provided the curriculum vitae and a list of 
cases for one of her 5 experts, Dr. Wyman, but did not provide information on any of the 
other 4 experts and did not provide any reports. (R. 168). 
18. On April 4, 2007, Gold's filed their Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 58-
136). 
However, the delay was due to Peay's mistaken belief that the set of interrogatories and 
requests for production of documents addressed to Peay Investment Company was simply 
a duplicate copy of the set of interrogatories and requests for production of documents to 
Gold's Gym. A response was quickly filed when this error was brought to defendants' 
attention. 
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19. Subsequently, on April 20, 2007, Johnson provided one expert report from 
Dr. Wyman. (R. 170). 
20. On April 24, 2007, Johnson filed her Motion for Extension of Time to 
Respond to Motion for Summary Judgment requesting a 45 day extension so that she 
could: (1) obtain affidavits from her daughter and son in law, Justin and Jocelyn Vance; 
(2) review the transcripts from the 5 depositions which had been taken; (3) obtain 
affidavits from her own experts; and (4) depose the owner of Peay Investments. Therein, 
Johnson asserted that her expert designation substantially complied with the Rules 
stating: 
Defendants complain that Plaintiffs experts have not provided reports. 
They were timely identified...the pleading that identified these experts... 
summarizes the essence of their testimony. Rule 26 (a)(3)... requires an 
expert report. But the report does not need to be signed by the expert... an 
expert's report need not be written and signed by the expert. It may be 
signed by the party. Counsel, acting as agent of Plaintiff, signed this 
pleading for her. This report gives some notice of what their testimony will 
be. Defendants chose to file this motion for summary judgment before they 
took any depositions of these witnesses. Plaintiffs should have additional 
time to obtain an affidavit from these experts and witnesses. 
(R. 140-149). 
21. Thereafter, on April 27, 2007, Gold's filed a motion to strike Johnson's 
expert designation as deficient in that it failed to comply with Rule 26(a)(3) in that 
among other things, she had not fully identified her experts and had not provided the 
necessary reports for four of her proposed experts. (R. 152- 173). 
22. On May 1, 2007, Gold's filed a motion to compel Johnson to produce all 
photographs of the condition which she alleged had caused her to trip having been 
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unsuccessful in its good faith attempts to secure the photographs during the previous 12 
months. (R. 174-209). 
23. On May 16, 2007, Johnson opposed the motion to strike asserting: (1) 
Peay's filing of its discovery responses two months earlier had precluded her from 
obtaining her engineer's, David Jenkins, expert report because he needed to know "the 
facts related to property management, safety, planning, maintenance, and repair before he 
decides whether he has an opinion he may share"; (2) her expert needed her own medical 
records from her treating physicians; (3) she needed to depose someone from Peay 
Investment. Johnson also withdrew her designation of "Clay" and Leslie Thornton and 
acknowledged that Dr. Wallentine would only testify as a treating physician. (R. 287-
291). 
24. On May 16, 2007, Johnson filed a notice of deposition of Richard Lynn 
Tregeagle, co-owner of Peay Investments of her intent to depose him 7 days later on May 
24,2007. (R. 305) 
25. That same day, May 16, 2007, Johnson filed a motion to compel Peay to 
supplement its responses to discovery asserting that she was entitled to the requested 
information in order to determine "how sophisticated of a property owner" Peay was. (R. 
292- 304). 
26. Gold's opposed the motion on May 21, 2007, in particular noting that 
Johnson's request that Peay identify all properties it currently owned as well as produce 
its tax returns for the past five years was irrelevant as the duty of a landowner is the same 
regardless of the depth of its pocket. (R. 313- 318). 
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27. Even though the discovery cutoff had occurred 5 months before, Johnson 
was permitted to depose Richard Lynn Tregeagle on June 11, 2007. (Exhibit B). 
28. On June 29, 2007, about 12 weeks after Gold's filed its summary judgment 
motion, Johnson filed her opposition. (R. 320- 402). 
29. On July 2, 2007, in a memorandum decision the court, while noting that in 
excess of 45 days had elapsed since her motion was filed, granted Johnson an extension 
to file her opposition until July 9, 2007. Further, the court denied Gold's motion to strike 
Johnson's designation of Drs. Wallentine and Wyman, but granted Gold's motion 
striking "Clay" and Leslie Thorton as Johnson had conceded that they would not be 
called. Additionally, David Jenkins was stricken as an expert because Johnson's expert 
disclosures were substantially deficient. (R. 403-409, Exhibit G). Therein, the district 
court explicitly reminded Johnson, in footnote 1, that she had not requested that her 
motion to compel be submitted for decision. Moreover, the district court granted Gold's 
motion to compel Johnson to disclose all photographs of the site and awarded Gold's its 
attorney's fees and costs for having to bring the motion. An order was entered on August 
8,2007. (R. 519). 
30. On July 9, 2007, Johnson filed the Affidavits of Justin Vance and Jocelyn 
Vance in support of her opposition to the motion for summary judgment. (R. 493-498). 
31. On September 17, 2007, in an 11 page memorandum decision, the district 
court granted summary judgment to Gold's finding that the broken pavement was a 
condition for which Johnson would have had to been able to show that Gold's had notice 
and opportunity to remedy, that there was no genuine issue of material fact that Gold's 
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did not have actual or constructive notice of the broken asphalt or an opportunity to cure 
given Johnson's "wholesale failure" to controvert the undisputed facts as required by 
Rule 7(c)(3)(B). Further, the court held that Johnson's claims against Gold's Gym were 
barred by the release she signed upon joining the gym. (R. 531-541, Exhibit H). 
32. Johnson filed a motion for reconsideration on October 10, 2007. She 
asserted that summary judgment was inappropriate where "[s]he said, '[a]lleged fact nos. 
11-12 are false.'" Attached to the motion were 9 photographs purportedly taken of the 
parking lot months and years after Johnson's fall, 3 aerial photographs asserted to be of 
the parking lot taken in 2000, 2004, and 2006,3 as well as Johnson's own declaration. 
Therein, for the fist time, Johnson contended that venue of the action was improper in 
American Fork. (R. 545- 632). 
33. The Order and Judgment granting summary judgment was entered on 
October 18, 2007. (R. 634-637). 
34. On October 24, 2007, Gold's filed its memorandum opposing the motion 
for reconsideration and moved to strike the photographs attached thereto. (R. 639- 640 
and 650- 686). 
35. On November 2, 2007, Johnson filed her request to submit the motion to 
compel she filed more than 6 months earlier for decision. (R. 698- 699). 
36. Johnson filed her notice of appeal on November 17, 2007. (R. 708- 709). 
3
 Johnson's purpose for attaching the aerial photographs is unclear where the area where 
new asphalt was laid was located a significant distance to the north of Gold's Gym and 
separated from it by two buildings and an expanse of parking lot. 
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37. On November 29, 2007, the district court issued a memorandum decision 
denying Johnson's motion to reconsider and her motion to compel and determined that 
Johnson had waived venue concerns by having not raised them earlier. Additionally, the 
district court struck the photographs attached to the motion for reconsideration because 
the materials had not been previously provided to Gold's and Johnson provided no 
justification which would entitle to court to conclude that the evidence was newly 
discovered. (R 710-723, Exhibit I). 
RELEVANT FACTS 
1. On July 7, 2004, Johnson joined Gold's Gym. (R. 68, 410-419 and Exhibit 
C, Defendants' First Set of Requests for Admission, Nos. 1 -3.)4 
2. As a condition of membership, Johnson was required to sign a contract that 
included the Assumption of Risk and Risk of Accident clause ("Release"). (R. 68, 410-
419 and Exhibit C, No. 11). 
3. Johnson read, signed and agreed to be bound to the terms and conditions of 
the Release. (R. 68, 410-419 and Exhibit C, Nos. 1-10). 
4. The Release executed by Johnson includes the following language: 
ASSUMPTION OF RISK AND RISK OF ACCIDENT 
...ANY PERSON USING THE EQUIPMENT OR THE FACILITIES 
DOES SO AT THEIR OWN RISK...and the Gym shall not be liable to 
Buyer or Member for any claims, demands, injuries, damages, or actions 
arising due to injury to Buyer or Member, their person, or property arising 
out of or in connection with the use by Buyer or Member of the services 
and facilities or the premises where the same is located and Buyer or 
4
 Deemed admitted as no response was received from Johnson within 30 days. 
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Member hereby holds the Gym, its employees and agents harmless from all 
claims which may be brought against them by Buyer or Member or on 
either of their behalf for such injuries of claims aforesaid. 
Assumption of Risk and Risk of Accident. (R. 136). 
5. On or about the evening of July 12, 2004, Johnson tripped and fell in the 
parking lot at Gold's' Gym after an hour long kick boxing and injured her knee. (R. 61 
and 320). 
6. Johnson claims she tripped and fell on broken asphalt somewhere 5-7 steps 
in front of, and to the right of, the front door to Gold's Gym. (R. 96- 97). 
7. Gold's had never observed or been made aware of any dangerous condition, 
either cracks or holes, or broken asphalt existing within the asphalt parking lot. Troy 
Peterson, the Vice President of Gold's Gym, testified that he regularly inspected the 
parking lot and had never seen a condition which required repair. 
Q: Have you ever seen a crack in the parking lot that you thought might 
pose a danger to a patron? 
A: I have not. 
(R. 106- 107). 
8. Johnson's counsel asked Mr. Peterson the following: 
Q: At any time, have you ever had any information that helped you 
understand where [Johnson's] injury happened? 
A: No, I have not. 
Q: So you've never formed an opinion of where it happened? 
Q: I have no idea where it happened. 
(R. 103-104). 
9. Kandi Negrete, who was the Assistant Manager at Gold's Gym the time of 
Johnson's fall and who has been employed by Gold's Gym at this location since 1999, 
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inspected the premises, including the parking lot, on a daily basis. She testified as 
follows: 
A: Have I ever looked at the condition of the pavement? 
Q: In the parking lot. 
At Yes. 
Q: Have you ever observed anything in the parking lot that you think— 
that you think needed repair? 
A: No. 
(R. 110-112). 
10. Nate Loftin, the Maintenance Director at Gold's Gym since July 1999, 
similarly testified that he had no prior knowledge of any reports of problems or potential 
problems involving the asphalt at the Gold's Gym location where Johnson fell. (R. 115-
118). 
11. Moreover, despite having more than 1,000 visitors a day, prior to Johnson, 
there had been no reports of any accidents or falls in the parking lot caused by cracks, 
holes, or broken asphalt. (R. 66, 410-419 and Exhibit D, Nos. 9 and 14 and Exhibit E, 
No. 1.) 
12. During her visit to the gym days before her fall, Johnson herself did not 
observe any problems with the asphalt or trip hazards. (R. 81:24 - 82:5). 
13. Similarly, Johnson did not see the broken asphalt before she fell and did not 
know how long it had existed. (R. 93:18-24). 
14. Lynn Tregeagle, owner of Peay Investment Company, testified, in pertinent 
part, as follows: 
Q: So, are you willing to say what you consider a trip hazard as a 
17 
property owner? 
A: I will tell you that my experience tells me that a trip hazard— 
somebody could trip off of that smooth carpeted floor. That's as 
far as I—my experience tells me that, because I've done it myself. 
Q: So what elevation would you strive to eliminate to make a floor 
free from trip hazards? ... 
A: There isn't. Every individual is capable of tripping over a smooth 
surface. 
(Exhibit F, 35:2- 12). 
15. Johnson has not provided any evidence that Gold's had notice of any 
dangerous condition existing in the parking lot prior to her fall. (R. 61-68 and 410-419). 
16. Similarly, Johnson has not provided any evidence of how or when this 
break in the asphalt occurred. (R. 61-68 and 410-419). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
As the broken asphalt in the parking lot in front of the entrance to Gold's Gym 
which Johnson alleges caused her to trip was not created or selected by Gold's, it was a 
temporary condition of which notice, either actual or constructive, and an opportunity to 
cure are required before liability may attach. 
Where Johnson failed to meet her burden of creating any issue of material fact that 
Gold's did not have actual notice or constructive notice of the condition, nor an 
opportunity to cure the broken asphalt, the district court correctly determined that her 
ordinary negligence premises liability claim could not survive summary judgment. 
Moreover, the district court also correctly determined that even if Johnson could 
show notice and an opportunity to cure, because she signed a Release under which she 
clearly and unequivocally released Gold's Gym from its negligence for any and all claims 
for injuries sustained on the premises, which included trip and falls in the parking lot, she 
could not maintain an action against Gold's Gym. 
Lastly, given Johnson's incessant refusal to provide required disclosures or 
otherwise comply with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, even after being sanctioned by 
the court for her failure to provide the requested discovery, the district court acted within 
its discretion in striking Johnson's expert designation of David Jenkins where she failed 
to even provide a written report or his qualifications and in striking the photographs 
attached to her motion for reconsideration which were never previously provided. 
Implicitly recognizing her failure to controvert any of the facts set forth by Gold's, 
which undisputedly establish that Gold's did not have actual or constructive notice of the 
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broken pavement, Johnson asserts that constructive notice may be inferred based upon 
subsequent occurring events and because those performing the daily inspections of the 
parking lot for Gold's lacked specific training in asphalt maintenance. She also asks the 
court to close its eyes to the fact that one thousand patrons crossed the same area without 
incident 6 days a week, that she herself, both in the days before her fall and at the time 
she fell, did not see any defect in the asphalt. Additionally, Johnson contends she should 
not be held to the terms of the Release because she was distracted and didn't understand 
what it was that she signed. As the district court correctly stated, "[t]he sum and 
substance" of Johnson's appeal is that "speculation should rule the day." 
Viewing the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a light most 
favorable to her, all Johnson has shown after the close of fact and expert discovery is that 
she fell in the parking lot and hurt her knee and that she subsequently made a claim. The 
undisputed facts are that the parking lot was inspected on a daily basis, that no dangerous 
broken asphalt had been observed prior to Johnson's fall, that Johnson herself did not 
observe this condition either on the day she fell or at any other time when she frequented 
the gym, and that more than 1,000 visitors had safely traversed this same area six days a 
week without incident. If summary judgment is not affirmed, the exact scenario the Utah 
Supreme Court cautioned against will occur, "not only would the jury have to speculate 
about whether [Gold's] had notice of the dangerous gap in the first place, it would also 
have to speculate about whether [Gold's] had that notice far enough in advance to repair 
the gap before [Johnson's] accident." Goebel v. Salt Lake City S.R.R. Co., 2004 UT 80, «j  
25, 104 P.3d 1185. 
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ARGUMENT 
Summary judgment is appropriate in cases involving negligence where the 
evidence "is free from doubt so that all reasonable [persons] would come to 
the same conclusion." Schnuphase v. Storehouse, 918 P.2d 476, 477 (Utah 
1996) (citations omitted). 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT BROKEN PAVEMENT IS A 
TEMPORARY CONDITION FOR WHICH NOTICE AND AN OPPORTUNITY TO CURE IS 
REQUIRED. 
The law in Utah is well settled that "owners of stores... or other buildings where 
the public is invited to come on business or for pleasure are not insurers against all forms 
of accidents that may happen to any who come." Martin v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 565 
P.2d 1139, 1141 (Utah 1977). With respect to slip and falls on a store owner's property, 
the Utah Supreme Court has stated that "[t]he owner of a business is not a guarantor that 
his business invitees will not slip and fall." Schnuphase v. Storehouse Markets, 918 P.2d 
476, 478 (Utah 1996) {quoting Preston v. Lamb, 436 P.2d 1021, 1023 (Utah 1968)). 
Rather, a Utah business owner "is charged with the duty to use reasonable care to 
maintain the floor of his establishment in a reasonably safe condition for his patrons." 
Schnuphase, 918 P.2d at 478. 
A business owner's duty of reasonable care in slip and fall cases is dependant 
upon the nature of the condition: a condition is either a permanent condition or a 
temporary condition. Allen v. Federated Dairy Farms, 538 P.2d 175, 176 (Utah 1975); 
Jex v. JRA, 2007 UT App 249, ^ 10. The distinction between a permanent condition and 
a temporary condition lies in how the condition came to be. 
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Specifically, if a condition was created or chosen by a defendant such as "the 
structure of a building, or of a stairway, etc. or in equipment or machinery, or its manner 
of use" it is a permanent condition and the defendant is deemed to have knowledge of the 
condition that it created and no further proof of notice is necessary. Allen, 538 P.2d at 
176. See also Canfieldv. Albertsons, 841 P.2d 1224 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) cert, denied 
853 P.2d 897 (negligent method of operation in lettuce display created by defendant 
grocery store was permanent condition for which defendant was presumed to have 
notice). 
In contrast, a condition which is created or chosen by nature or a third party is a 
temporary condition and a store owner only has a duty to remedy once it has notice of the 
condition. Martin v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 565 P.2d 1139, 1141 (Utah 1977) (ice on 
sidewalk); Schnuphase, 918 P.2d at 478 (scoop of ice cream dropped on the floor by 
another customer); Jex v JRA, 2007 UT App 249, n. 1 (snow melting from shoe of 
delivery driver). 
When a defendant did not create a condition, the Utah Supreme Court has 
explicitly held that a plaintiff must present "evidence of notice and a reasonable time to 
remedy . . . to survive a motion for summary judgment" in a situation where a "plaintiff 
alleges that a defendant... negligently allowed an otherwise safe condition to degrade 
over time into a dangerous condition." Goebel v. Salt Lake City Southern R. Co., 2004 
UT 80,122. As aptly stated by Johnson, the rationale for requiring notice is "that a party 
may not know about the unsafe condition long enough to require them to fix it before 
someone is hurt." (Br. Appellant at 36). 
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Johnson asserts that "[t]he unsafe asphalt clearly occurred over time and is a result 
of lack of maintenance. But these facts do not mean that the condition is temporary in 
nature." (Br. Appellant at 32). Rather, Johnson proposes that because Gold's is 
"responsible for the condition because of their duty as possessors of land to business 
invitees" and that "duty is permanent, not temporary" the broken asphalt "should be 
evaluated under the same standard as an unsafe condition of a permanent nature." (Br. 
Appellant at 37). 
Johnson's creative contention that because Gold's had a "permanent" duty to 
maintain the parking lot, any defect found therein should also be considered "permanent" 
of which Gold's should be presumed to have had notice, is contrary to Utah law. 
Adoption of Johnson's formulation of premises liability would result in business owners 
becoming the insurers of the safety of their invitees. 
Broken asphalt in a parking lot is not a "permanent" condition of which Gold's is 
presumed to have notice because Gold's did not create or chose the condition. Rather it 
is a condition which may have occurred spontaneously or evolved over time and for 
which Gold's is responsible only in the context of maintenance. See Goebel, 2004 UT 
80,TJ20. 
In order to maintain her negligence claim, Johnson would have had to produce 
some evidence that Gold's had actual notice that this condition existed in the parking lot 
or that this condition had existed for such a long period of time that Gold's would have 
constructive knowledge of it. The Utah Supreme Court has explicitly held that "evidence 
of notice and a reasonable time to remedy are required to survive a motion for summary 
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judgment" in a situation where a "plaintiff alleges that a defendant... negligently allowed 
an otherwise safe condition to degrade over time into a dangerous condition." Goebel v. 
Salt Lake City Southern R. Co., 2004 UT 80, ^ 22. 
In Goebel, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant, who had an easement to use 
railroad tracks and was required to maintain the tracks, was negligent in permitting a gap 
to occur in between two field panels at a railroad crossing and that his bike wheel had 
fallen into that gap causing him to crash. In affirming the trial court's directed verdict in 
favor of the defendant, the Utah Supreme Court rejected plaintiffs contention that the 
gap between the two surfaces was a permanent condition of which defendant was 
presumed to have notice. Instead, the court held that the gap was not a permanent 
condition. In so holding, the court explained that a permanent condition is one "of a 
permanent nature, such as: in the structure of building, or of a stairway, etc. or in 
equipment or machinery, or in the manner of use, which was created or chosen by 
defendant" Id. \ 19. The rationale is that "it is reasonable to presume that a party has 
notice of conditions that the party itself creates, but it is not reasonable to presume notice 
of conditions that someone else creates, that arise from malfunctions, or that gradually 
evolve on their own." Id. f 22 (citations omitted). Accordingly, when a defendant does 
not actually create an unsafe condition, but is responsible for it only in the context of 
maintenance, then it is not a permanent condition and the plaintiff is required to show 
notice in order to proceed with a negligence claim. Id. f 20 {citing Fishbaugh v. Utah 
Power & Light, 969 P.2d 403 (Utah 1998)). 
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Applying the analysis elucidated by the Utah Supreme Court in Goebel to this 
case, as a matter of law because the condition was not permanent, in order to survive 
summary judgment Johnson would have had to have produced some evidence tending to 
show that Gold's had notice. "[BJecause here, the defendant did not create the unsafe 
condition, and is 'responsible' for it only in the context of maintenance, not for its 
existence in the first place" the broken asphalt at issue is not a condition of a permanent 
nature for which notice may be presumed. Id. ^ 20. 
Goebel is controlling in the present case. Johnson's attempt to distinguish Goebel 
from the current case falls flat. Like the plaintiff in Goebel, Johnson herself had only 
days before traversed this same area and had not observed the condition. Similar to the 
defendant in Goebel who performed regular inspections, here, Gold's performed daily 
inspections. Any break in an asphalt parking lot clearly falls within the definition of 
temporary condition, as by its nature, was not created or selected by Gold's. The 
undisputed testimony is that Gold's conducted regular daily inspections of the parking 
lot, and had no notice whether actual or constructive of any break in the asphalt. 
Johnson's proposal that a "defect of the condition of the asphalt ... in a parking lot 
of a business ... should be evaluated as a permanent condition of property, and not as a 
temporary condition that requires notice and time to fix... before the business may be 
held liable" is wholly inconsistent with Utah law. (Br. Appellant at 48). Thus, the 
district court correctly determined that the broken asphalt over which Johnson tripped 
was a temporary condition of which Gold's would have had to have notice, either actual 
or constructive. 
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II. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT JOHNSON COULD NOT 
MAINTAIN HER ACTION ON A THEORY OF CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE. 
As a matter of law, Johnson failed to establish constructive notice because 
reasonable minds could not differ whether Gold's should have noticed the broken asphalt. 
The district court rightly found that no jury could have found Gold's to have constructive 
notice based on the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom even in the light 
most favorable to Johnson. 
Recognizing that Gold's did not have actual knowledge of the broken asphalt, 
Johnson argues that she should have been allowed to proceed to the jury under a theory of 
constructive notice. However, Johnson's "denial" of Facts Nos. 7 and 11 without setting 
forth any specific facts which would be admissible in evidence is insufficient to create a 
genuine issue of material fact. Dairy Prod. Servs. v. City ofWellsville, 2000 UT 81, \ 54, 
614 P.2d 160 (citations omitted). Johnson's reliance upon her own self serving "affidavit 
that merely reflects the affiant's unsubstantiated opinions and conclusions is insufficient 
to create an issue of fact." Id. at ^ 54, "[B]are contentions unsupported by any 
specification of facts in support thereof, raise no material questions of fact as will 
preclude the entry of summary judgment." Massey v. Utah Power & Light, 609 P.2d 937, 
938 (Utah 1980). 
Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it deemed 
admitted all of the facts which were not controverted due to Johnson's "wholesale failure 
to follow Rule 7(c)(3)(B)." (R. 531, n. 1). See Gary Porter Const, v. Fox Const., Inc., 
2004 UT App 354, ^ 10, cert, denied 123 P.3d 815. Summary judgment should 
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particularly be affirmed where Johnson continues to rest upon her bare assertion that she 
disputes the facts found to be undisputed without producing any evidence to support her 
theories. 
Constructive notice is "where information or knowledge of a fact is imputed to a 
person by law 'because he could have discovered the fact by proper diligence, and his 
situation was such as to cast upon him the duty of inquiring into it.'" Matheson v. 
Marbec Investments, LLC, 2007 UT App 363, ]f 7, 173 P.3d 199 {quoting In re Discipline 
ofSonnenreich, 2004 UT 3,1j 22 n. 9). 
In Mitchell v. Christensen, the Utah Supreme Court stated that "in determining 
what constitutes reasonable care in the discovery of defects, the proper standard is 
whether the defect would be apparent to the ordinary prudent persons with like 
experience, not to persons with specialized knowledge in the field of construction or real 
estate." 2001 UT 80, f 12, 31 P.3d 572. 
In Matheson, the court affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the 
landowner from the premises liability claims asserted by the Plaintiff who was injured by 
a broken stair tread at an apartment complex due to Plaintiffs inability to show that 
Defendant had notice of the condition. First, the court determined that because the 
broken stair tread was a condition which Defendant did not create, it was a temporary 
condition for which notice, either actual or constructive, had to be shown by Plaintiff in 
order to survive summary judgment. After conceding that Defendant did not have actual 
notice of the condition, Plaintiff argued that there was a genuine issue of fact whether 
Defendant had constructive notice. 
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In support of his argument, Plaintiff contended that constructive notice should be 
inferred against the Defendant because, as a general contractor, he should be held to a 
higher duty to inspect the building. Plaintiff contended that it was not enough for 
Defendant to have performed multiple physical inspections, including an inspection by a 
MAI appraiser, 9 months earlier when Defendant purchased the property. While Plaintiff 
acknowledged that these inspections would have satisfied the duty owed by an average 
defendant without a contractor's license, Plaintiff argued that Defendant had a duty to 
perform more thorough inspections due to his training as a general contractor. 
The court in Matheson rejected the Plaintiffs suggestion of holding Defendant to 
a higher duty of inspections because there was no evidence that Defendant as a general 
contractor had "experience constructing stairs in general, let alone his experience 
respecting this type of stair design... [i]ndeed, ...Plaintiffs counsel asserted that these 
stairs... were something with which [Defendant] had no experience." Id. at f^ 9. 
Moreover, the court found that there was no issue of material fact to support a finding of 
constructive notice where the multiple inspections performed 9 months earlier satisfied 
the Defendant's inspection obligations and stated "in the absence of some other 
indication that there was a problem with the stairs, the inspections performed were 
completely reasonable under these circumstances and satisfied Defendant's duty of 
proper diligence." Id. \ 7. 
As support for her argument, Johnson suggests that she be given an "inference" 
that Gold's had constructive notice because those performing the daily inspections of the 
parking lot did not have specific training in asphalt maintenance and that actions 
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occurring after her fall should support an "inference" of notice before her fall. Both 
arguments are without merit. 
First, Johnson suggests that because those performing the daily inspections of the 
parking lot did not have specialized training in asphalt maintenance that those inspections 
should be treated as a nullity. The deficiency of this argument is best exemplified by 
Johnson's own brief. Therein, Johnson not only recognizes, but in fact cites controlling 
case law that constructive knowledge of the defect may only be inferred where the 
"defect would be apparent to ordinary prudent person with like experience, not to persons 
with specialized knowledge in the field of construction." (Br. Appellant at 23 and 38 
citing Mitchell v. Christens en and Matheson v. Mar bee Investments). 
Johnson focuses on the phrase "like experience" to assert that those who 
performed the daily inspections of the parking lot had to have specialized knowledge in 
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the field of asphalt maintenance in order to identify defects. As elucidated in Matheson, 
however, Johnson's assertion that those performing the inspections for Gold's lacked 
specialty knowledge only demonstrates that constructive notice cannot be inferred. 
Above and beyond the inspections performed 9 months before the plaintiffs injury in 
Matheson, here, Gold's performed inspections of the parking lot 6 days a week. While 
those performing the inspections were not asphalt experts, they certainly were able to, 
and did, exercise reasonable care in inspecting the parking lot and at no time observed 
any defects. Moreover, that Johnson herself didn't see the broken asphalt either on the 
day she fell or in the days before when she walked over the same area is a resonating fact. 
Accordingly much more than an "inference" would be required. In this case, Johnson 
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failed as a matter of law to establish constructive notice. The undisputed evidence does 
not support even an inference of constructive notice which would enable the case to go to 
a jury. 
Johnson's second argument that constructive notice might be "imputed" to Gold's 
based upon information and actions occurring months and years after her fall should 
similarly be rejected. Not only would Johnson be precluded from offering such 
information as subsequent remedial repairs, even if she were, it amounts to nothing more 
than sheer conjecture and speculation. As plainly stated by this court recently, 
"[constructive notice cannot be grounded on speculation or mere allegation." Jex, 2007 
UT App at % 13 (citingLindsay v. Eccles Hotel Co., 284 P.2d 477, 478 (Utah 1955); 
accordMahmoodv. Ross, 1999 UT 104, 990 P.2d 933, 938 (Utah 1999) (stating that 
"although juries may make deductions based on reasonable probabilities, the evidence 
must do more than merely raise a conjecture or show a probability.") 
In order for a plaintiff to establish that a temporary condition had existed for a 
sufficient amount of time to give a business defendant constructive notice of it, she must 
be able to present evidence that "would show from the condition of the debris on the floor 
that it had been there for an [] appreciable time." Ohlson v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 568 
P.2d 753, 754 (Utah 1977) (inference of constructive notice could be found where dry 
spaghetti on floor which was alleged to have cause fall was dirty, crushed into small 
pieces and spread into main isle) accord Jex, 2007 UT App at TJ 13 (holding that it would 
be improper to impute constructive notice where no evidence to suggest puddle had been 
there for any significant period of time). 
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In Fishbaugh v. Utah Power & Light, 969 P.2d 403 (Utah 1998) the Utah Supreme 
Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant due to plaintiffs 
failure to present evidence of notice and an opportunity to cure. Fishbaugh, who was hit 
by a car at night while crossing a public street, sued the city and UP&L for negligently 
failing to repair the street lights. Fishbaugh presented evidence that the street lights were 
not functioning that night but had no admissible evidence tending to show how long the 
street lights had not been functioning. The court found that even if there was evidence 
that the defendant had notice of the condition of the street lights, because Fishbaugh had 
presented no evidence to indicate how long defendants had such notice, Fishbaugh could 
not "prove that [defendants] failed to repair the streetlights within a reasonable time after 
receiving notice and that they were thus negligent in maintaining the street lights." Id. at 
408. 
Similar to Fishbaugh, Johnson produced no evidence to support her assertions that 
the broken asphalt had "occurred over time" or that the condition "may have been there 
for years." (Br. Appellant at 32). Instead, as support of her proposed "inference" of 
constructive notice, Johnson offers "evidence" of subsequent occurring events. She 
proposes that her letter to Gold's Gym requesting compensation sent after her fall 
provides a sufficient basis from which to infer constructive notice before her fall. 
Similarly, Johnson offers photographs taken months and years after her fall (photographs 
nos. 3-6 were stricken from the record due to Johnson's failure to produce them prior to 
her motion for reconsideration) some showing repairs as evidence to support her theory 
that Gold's had constructive notice before her fall. She also offers 3 aerial photographs 
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taken of the parking lot (again produced the first time attached to her motion for 
reconsideration). Even if this "evidence"' had been produced prior to Johnson's motion 
for reconsideration and had not been stricken, subsequent remedial repairs are not 
admissible and do not create an inference of constructive notice. See Potter v. W.H. 
Groves Latter-Day Saints Hospital, 103 P.2d 2805 282 (Utah 1940) ("Evidence of 
alterations or repairs to premises under his control made following an accident therein is 
inadmissible to show as against a defendant that the former condition was unsafe or was 
being negligently maintained.") 
Additionally, given that Gold's Gym is the large square building on the corner of 
450 North and 900 East in the aerial photographs (nos. 7, 8, and 9), the entry to which 
faces 900 East, and the "repairs" are located a significant distance to the north of the 
entrance to Gold's and separated from Gold's by the expanse of two buildings and a 
portion of parking lot, the aerial photographs show that the repairs to an entirely different 
portion of the parking lot are irrelevant. 
Johnson's "mere hypothesis that the [broken asphalt] may have existed for some 
unknown length of time does not suffice." Goebel at If 25. The undisputed evidence is 
that Gold's Gym had more than 1,000 visitors per day, six days a week in 2004 and not 
one of those visitors had ever tripped or reported cracks, holes, or broken asphalt in the 
parking lot. Johnson herself didn't even observe this broken asphalt either the days 
before the accident or on the day she fell. 
At the end of the day, after the close of expert and fact discovery and despite 
having conducted numerous depositions and other discovery, there is no evidence from 
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which a reasonable jury could conclude that Gold's failed to reasonably inspect the 
parking lot and it is undisputed that Gold's did not have actual or constructive knowledge 
that there was a break in the asphalt in the parking lot, let alone a reasonable time to 
remedy any such condition. Johnson's failure to provide any evidence that Gold's had 
actual or constructive notice of the alleged defect or an opportunity to cure is fatal to 
Johnson's claims. Fishbaugh at 408. "[A] mere fall does not prima facie establish a jury 
question." Koer v. Mayfair Mkts., 431 P.2d 566, 569 (Utah 1967). Consequently, this 
Court should affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment. 
III. THE ' ASSUMPTION OF RISK AND RISK OF ACCIDENT9 RELEASE 
PRECLUDES PLAINTIFF'S RECOVERY AGAINST GOLD'S GYM. 
Even assuming Johnson could volley the hurdle of proving notice and an 
opportunity to cure, which she has not done, the Release agreed to and signed by Johnson 
precludes her recovery against Gold's Gym. In Utah, a party may contract away their 
right to recover in tort for damages caused by the ordinary negligence of others. See 
Rothstein v. Snowbird, 2007 UT 96, Tf 6, 175 P.3d 560. The general principle is that 
"preinjury releases are enforceable." Berry v. Greater Park City Co., 2007 UT 87, % 13, 
171 P.3d 442; accord Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. First Security Corp., 341 P.2d 944, 
947 (Utah 1959) ("[Ojne may contract to protect himself against liability for loss caused 
by his negligence.") Contracts, such as the Release signed by Johnson, are enforced 
unless it offends public policy, falls within a public interest exception or is unclear or 
ambiguous. None of these exceptions are applicable to the Release Johnson signed and it 
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is therefore valid and enforceable. Thus, the district court's grant of summary judgment 
in favor of Gold's Gym should be affirmed. 
A. The Release is clear, unequivocal and unambiguous that Johnson 
released Gold's Gym from her negligence claim arising from use of the 
premises, which necessarily included the parking lot. 
The Release clearly and unequivocally bars Johnson's claims arising out of her use 
of the parking lot. When a clause purporting to release one party from liability is clear 
and unequivocal in its terms, the clause should be enforced. Russ v. Woodside Homes, 
905 P.2d 901, 906 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
In Russ v. Woodside Homes a couple had contracted with a builder to construct their 
family home. While on site to observe the construction, the wife tripped and fell on the 
property and thereafter died as a result of her injuries. Her husband brought suit against 
the builder. In affirming summary judgment in favor of the builder, this court held that 
the release clause contained in a paragraph within the construction contract by which the 
plaintiff agreed to hold defendant "harmless for 'any and all claims, damages, loss and 
expenses' and for 'any death, accident, injury, or other occurrence resulting from visits to 
the job site" was enforceable. Id. 906. The clause was held to be a sufficiently clear and 
unequivocal expression of the intent to indemnify for a party's own negligence citing to 
Freundv. Utah Power and Light Co., 793 P.2d 362, 370 (Utah 1990) (internal quotations 
omitted) in which the court said, "[i]t is not necessary that the exculpatory language 
refers expressly to the negligence of the indemnitee, so long as the intention to indemnify 
can be clearly implied from the language and purposes of the entire agreement." 
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The intent of the parties in entering the Release to relieve Gold's Gym from 
liability for its alleged negligence in maintaining the parking lot is clearly and 
unequivocally expressed in the Release. The language of the Release signed by Johnson 
parallels the language found to be a clear and unequivocal expression in the Russ case. It 
states that Johnson "holds the Gym5 its employees and agents harmless from all claims" 
and that "the Gym shall not be liable to [Johnson] for any claims, demands, injuries, 
damages or actions arising due to injury." 
The language of the clause clearly covers Johnson's claims and injuries arising 
from her fall in the parking lot when it states that Gold's is not liable for "any claims, 
demands, injuries, damages or actions arising out of or in connection with the use by 
[Johnson] of the services and facilities or the premises where the same is located..." 
(emphasis added). Johnson contends that the district court committed legal error in finding 
that the word "premises" in the Release clearly and unequivocally referred to the parking 
lot. Again, Johnson merely concludes that the clause "premises" is ambiguous but fails to 
offer an alternative meaning of the term which does not encompass land. In order to be 
ambiguous, the term premises would have to be subject to more than one meaning. See 
Dixon v. Pro Image, Inc., 1999 UT 89, ^ f 14, 987 P.2d 48 (an unambiguous contract may be 
interpreted as a matter of law). As stated by Johnson, the word "premises" is defined in 
the dictionary as "buildings on land." (Br. Appellant at 31). Accordingly, the term 
"premises" is not ambiguous and cannot be interpreted in such a way to exclude the 
parking lot used by the patrons of Gold's Gym. See Interwest Construction v. Palmer, 
35 
923 P.2d 1350, 1358-1359 (Utah 1996) (stating that unambiguous contract provisions 
may be interpreted as a matter of law.) 
Johnson relies upon Ghionis v. Deer Valley Resort Co., in support of her argument 
that she should not be bound by the Release she signed. 839 F.Supp. 789 (D. Utah 1993). 
However, at issue in Ghionis was whether the terms "as is" embedded within a ski 
equipment rental agreement was an effective disclaimer of the express or implied 
warranties relating to the equipment. That the term was not set apart with quotation 
marks or bold type, but "slipped into a paragraph without any indication to the average 
consumer that they were words of art with distinct legal" meaning lead the court to 
conclude that the warranty disclaimer was not conspicuous enough to satisfy the statutory 
requirements. Id. at 793. 
Even if Ghionis was applicable, from a layman's perspective the Release is 
primarily aimed at shifting risk of injury onto the signor and is conspicuous in nature. 
The Release is found at the very top of the page and is titled ASSUMPTION OF RISK 
AND RISK OF ACCIDENT in capital, bold letters. Moreover, the Release is set apart 
from the remainder of the form and is separately signed by Johnson. 
Johnson then cites to Adloo v. Brown, 686 A.2d 298 (Md. 1996) in support of her 
assertion that an exculpatory clause "should not be enforced when it releases a defendant 
from his own negligence."5 (Br. Appellant at 30). Even if Johnson's partial citation was 
5
 Stating "the general rule -contracts will not be construed to indemnify a person against 
his own negligence unless an intention to do so is expressed in those very words or in 
other unequivocal terms. Adloo v. Brown, 686 A.2d 298, 302 (Md. 1996) (emphasis 
added). 
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an accurate statement of Maryland law, such an assertion is clearly contradictory to Utah 
law. See Russ v. Woodside Homes, Inc., 905 P.2d 901 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (discussed 
above). 
Similarly, Johnson's citations to Johnson v. Rapid City Softball Association, 514 
N.W.2d 693 (S.D. 1994) and Yang v. Voyagaire Houseboats, Inc., 701 N.W.2d 783 (Minn. 
2005) are inapplicable and inaccurate. Johnson asserts that the court in Rapid City held that 
the release which released the city from negligence in maintaining its public athletic fields 
was unenforceable on public policy grounds. (Br. Appellant at 30). However, the Rapid 
City court did not invalidate the release, but reversed and remanded the case back to the trial 
court to determine whether the player had consented to the release. 514 N.W.2d 693. 
Johnson then asserts that the release in Yang was held unenforceable, but cleverly omits that 
the court in so holding, found that the defendant was an innkeeper providing a public 
service who, for public policy reasons, could not contractually limit their duty to the public. 
(Br. Appellant at 30). As discussed below, even if the above cases stood for the 
propositions asserted by Johnson, Gold's Gym is not a public entity or an innkeeper 
providing a public service, and therefore its contract with Johnson to limit its liability is not 
against public policy. 
By failing to respond to Defendants' Fist Set of Requests for Admissions, Johnson 
is deemed to have read and understood the Release and agreed to be bound by the terms 
and conditions therein when she signed the Release of liability form. Johnson asserts in 
defense that she was "distracted [] from reading, analyzing and understanding the release 
clause" and that "the saleman (sic) did not explain the clause." (Br. Appellant at 25). 
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Ignorance, however, is not a defense. See Pearce v. Utah Athletic Foundation, 2008 UT 
13, % 5, 179 P.3d 760; accordRuss v. Woodside Homes, Inc., 905 P.2d at 906 (explaining 
that the "[defendant] is not required to show that the [plaintiff] understood the hold harmless 
provision before it asserts the provision's protection. In Utah, contracts mean what they 
say, and parties will be bound by them.") Accordingly, Johnson's claimed ignorance does 
not preclude the enforcement of the contract she signed. Moreover, if the terms of the 
Release were not acceptable to Johnson, she could have elected not to join the Gym. 
B. The Release is not against public policy. 
There is no public policy against the enforcement of the Release. A release which 
does not invoke public policy will be upheld. Rothstein v. Snowbird Corp., 2007 UT 96, 
Tf 6. Johnson makes the syllogistic fallacy that because Gold's Gym has a duty to 
maintain its parking lot and that a member of the public might cross its parking lot, 
Gold's Gym has a public duty. (Br. Appellant at 28). Johnson's failure to cite to a single 
public policy against upholding the release between a private gym and a gym member is 
significant. 
Unlike the public policy against a parent signing a release of a minor's prospective 
claim for negligence, Hawkins v. Pert, 2001 UT 94, f^ 5, 37 P.3d 1062, a release 
involving master-servant agreements, Pugmire v. Or. Short Line R.R. Co., 92 P. 762, 767 
(Utah 1907), or where the legislature has clearly articulated public policy and the 
implications of that public policy are unmistakable, Berry v. Greater Park City Co., 2007 
UT 94, Tf 15 (held ski resort release unenforceable in light of Utah's Inherent Risk of 
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Skiing Act). Here, there is no applicable public policy which renders the subject release 
entered into by an adult to become a member of a private gym unenforceable. 
C. Membership in a private gym does not meet the public interest 
exception. 
Membership in a private gym is a recreational activity that does not constitute a 
public interest and therefore, the preinjury release signed by Johnson cannot be 
invalidated under the public interest exception. Pearce v. Utah Athletic Foundation, 
2008 UT 13, If 21, 179P.3d760. 
Pearce suffered a back injury while riding a bobsled and brought claims against 
the owner of the Utah Winter Sports Park. In affirming summary judgment in favor of 
the Park on Pearce"s ordinary negligence claim, after surveying the majority of 
jurisdictions which have consistently concluded that recreational activities do not fit 
within the public interest exception, rather than going through the six factor test set out in 
Tunkl v. Reagents of University of California, and adopted by the court in Berry v. 
Greater Park City Co., 2007 UT 87, the Utah Supreme Court explicitly adopted the 
general rule that "preinjury releases for recreational activities are not invalid under the 
public interest exception." Id. at j^ 21. In so doing, it determined that bobsledding is a 
recreational activity that does not meet public interest exception. Id. at 21. Accord 
Berry v. Greater Park City Company, 2007 UT 87 (skiercross racing is recreational 
activity that does not constitute a public interest). 
Here, it is unquestionable that membership in a private gym is a recreational 
activity. Accordingly, pursuant to the general rule set forth in Pearce v. Utah Athletic 
39 
Foundation, the preinjury release signed by Johnson does not implicate the public interest 
exception and should be enforced. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ACTED WTIHIN ITS DISCRETION IN STRIKING JOHNSON'S 
EXPERT AND PREVIOUSLY UNDISCLOSED PHOTOGRAPHS DUE TO HER FAILURE 
TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE DISCLOSURES. 
Johnson's ongoing adamant refusal to comply with the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure provided ample justification for the court to strike her proposed expert, David 
Jenkins and to strike the photographs attached to her motion for reconsideration. The 
district court's evidentiary rulings striking Johnson's expert witness designation and 
photographs are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. American Interstate 
Mortg. Corp. v. Edwards, 2002 UT App. 16, U 10. 
Pursuant to the stipulated scheduling order, Johnson's expert witness designation 
was due on December 15, 2007. (R. 21-23). On February 28, 2007, Johnson filed her 
designation of expert witnesses. Her designation of expert witnesses consisted solely of 
providing the name (and in one instance, just the first name "Clay" without a surname) 
and contact information of 5 individuals and a vague description of the subject matter on 
which those experts might opine. (R. 47- 49). No written reports or other required 
information was provided. (R. 168). Johnson asserted that not only was her designation 
timely, but that it fully satisfied her obligations of full disclosure under Rule 26 (a)(3). 
(R. 140-149). Subsequently, Johnson withdrew her designation of "Clay" and Leslie 
Thornton. (R. 287- 291). Thereafter, the court limited Johnson's treating physician's 
testimony to that of a treating provider and struck Johnson's remaining expert designation 
of David Jenkins concluding her "disclosures were deficient." (R. 403-409). 
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Additionally, the district court acted within its discretion in striking down 
Johnson's attempt to "supplement" the record by attaching photographs of the parking lot 
which had never been previously provided. Aside from the fact that Johnson had a duty 
to disclose such evidence under Rule 26 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, "any 
photographs of the alleged negligent condition" had been specifically requested by 
Gold's in April 2006 (R. 176) and such photographs were arguably subject to the court's 
order compelling Johnson to produce photographs of the alleged condition entered 
months before. (R. 403-409). Johnson failed to produce this "evidence" at any time prior 
to her motion for reconsideration of the summary judgment. 
Given Johnson's repeated attempts to circumvent the purpose underlying Rule 26 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, it was not an abuse of discretion for the district 
court to strike David Jenkins as an expert for Johnson, or to strike the previously 
undisclosed photographs. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN FINDING JOHNSON'S MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION MERITLESS. 
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Johnson's motion for 
reconsideration or in refusing to receive the additional evidence attached thereto. 
Johnson challenges the court's denial of her motion for reconsideration and asserts that in 
filing her motion for reconsideration she had "hoped to ... help the trial court avoid the 
embarrassment of being reversed on appeal." (Br. Appellant at 46). As motions to 
reconsider are not recognized in Utah, Gillett v. Price, 2006 UT 24, fflf 5, 7-8, Johnson 
may be correct in her assessment that "the trial court was obviously perturbed by [her] 
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motion for reconsideration." (Br. Appellant at 45). However, Johnson's accusation that 
the trial court acted "in the spirit of resentment of having to evaluate the evidence against 
summary judgment" and that the "trial court fails to grasp the importance of a fair 
litigation process for [Johnson]" is clearly undeserved. (Br. Appellant at 46). 
The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly discouraged the filing of these motions, 
as it is not a permitted or recognized motion under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Ron 
Shepherd Ins., Inc. v. Shields, 882 P.2d 650, 653 (Utah 1994). Because trial courts are 
under no obligation to consider motions for reconsideration, any decision to address or 
not to address the merits of such a motion is highly discretionary. Absent an abuse of 
discretion it should not be disturbed. Timm v. Dewsnup, 921 P.2d 1381, 1386 (Utah 
1996); Shepherd v. Shields, 882 P.2d 650, 653 (Utah 1994). Under this standard, the trial 
court's ruling may be overturned only "if there is no reasonable basis for the decision." 
Langelandv. Monarch Motors, 952 P.2d 1058, 1061 (Utah 1998). 
The district court had ample justification for its refusal to permit Johnson to 
reargue her case or to permit Johnson to supplement the record with additional evidence 
not previously produced. Even if the additional evidence attached to Johnson's motion 
for reconsideration was relevant, because Johnson presented no justification for why her 
own declaration and photographs taken by her expert years before (which were arguably 
subject to Gold's motion to compel discovery previously granted) could not have been 
disclosed previously, it was not error for the court to find that it was not "newly 
discovered" and inadmissible. 
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The court's determination that this evidence was inadmissible due to Johnson's 
failure to act with reasonable diligence before summary judgment was granted is 
supported by the record. Accordingly, the district court properly exercised its discretion 
in denying Johnson's motion for reconsideration and in refusing to receive additional 
evidence, never previously disclosed, as irrelevant and inadmissible. 
VI. THE DISTRICT COURT ACTED WITHIN ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO 
CONSIDER JOHNSON'S UNTIMELY-RAISED OBJECTION TO REASSIGNMENT FROM 
PROVO TO AMERICAN FORK. 
Even if the contention had merit, by failing to object when Judge Howard recused 
himself and the case was reassigned to American Fork from Provo until after summary 
judgment was entered, Johnson waived any objection. '"[A]s a general rule, claims not 
raised before the trial court may not be raised on appeal.'" State v. Cram, 2002 UT 37, f^ 
9, {quoting State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 7 4 4 11, 10 P.3d 346). Two policy considerations 
underlie the preservation rule. First, the rule exists "to give the trial court an opportunity 
to 'address the claimed error, and if appropriate, correct it.'" Id. 110. Second, requiring 
preservation of an issue prevents a party from avoiding the issue for strategic reasons 
only to raise the issue on appeal if the strategy fails. Id. Tf 10. 
Johnson first asserted her change of venue challenge in her motion for 
reconsideration. The district court refused to hear the argument because summary 
judgment had already been decided and it determined that she had waived the argument 
by not raising it before. Because Johnson did not raise the issue at any time prior to the 
granting of summary judgment, the district court acted within its discretion in refusing to 
address the issue having determined that she had abandoned it. In other words, by not 
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allowing the trial judge an adequate opportunity to consider the issue prior to summary 
judgment, Johnson waived the right to raise the issue on appeal. Johnson had a fair 
opportunity to raise and have the reassignment issue determined, but elected not to do so. 
Johnson's election to proceed following the reassignment is conclusive. 
Even if Johnson had not waived any opposition by continuing to litigate the matter 
in American Fork, as summarily stated by the district court, Johnson's "challenge to 
venue in the American Fork department is meritless" as "American Fork is in the same 
county as Provo." (R. 720). 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the reasons set forth above, appellees respectfully request the Court to affirm the 
judgment of the district court and awarded appellees their attorneys fees incurred in this 
appeal based upon Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ;&?«/ day of July, 2008. 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. 
( Scott T. Evans 
Heather L. Thuet 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that on the Z~S> day of July, 2008, two true and correct copies of 
the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEES were mailed, postage prepaid, to: 
S. Austin Johnson 
Johnson Law Associates 
345 B East University Parkway 
Orem, Utah 84058 
Attorneys for Appellant 
\ Scott T. Wans 
Heather L. Thuet 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees 
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S. Austin Johnson (USB# 5179) 
JOHNSON LAW ASSOCIATES 
345-B East University Parkway 
Orem, Utah 84058 
Tel: (801)426-7900 
Fax:(801)805-4815 
Attorney for Plaintiff Nelda P. Johnson 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DIVISION STATE OF UTAH 
NELDA P. JOHNSON, ] 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. ) 
GOLD'S GYM and PEAY INVESTMENT * 
COMPANY ; 
Defendant. ] 
) AMENDED NOTICE OF DEPOSITION 
> Nate Loftin 
) Case No: 0504001206 PI 
) Judge: Fred D. Howard 
Notice is hereby given that Plaintiff Nelda P. Johnson will take the deposition of the 
defendant Nate Loftin on Thursday. February 01, 2006, beginning at 11:00 a.m. at the office of 
Johnson Law Associates, 345-B East University Parkway, Orem, Utah. Said deposition will be taken 
before a certified court reporter. 
Dated this j? ^ day of January, 2007. 
JOHNSON LAW ASSOCIATES 
S. Austin Johnson 
Attorney for Plaintiff Nelda P. Johnson 
JAN 3 1 2007 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this ffi day of January, 2007, a true and correct copy of this Notice of 
Taking deposition of Head of Gold Gym was mailed, postage prepaid. To the following: 
Scott T. Evans 
Heather L. Thuet 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. 
50 S. Main Street, Ste 1500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84144 
Depomax Reporting Service 
333 S. Rio Grande 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
}Jj*BM^ 
S. Austin Johnson (USB# 5179) 
JOHNSON LAW ASSOCIATES 
345-B East University Parkway 
Orem, Utah 84058 
Tel: (801)426-7900 
Fax:(801)805-4815 
Attorney for Plaintiff Nelda P. Johnson 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DIVISION STATE OF UTAH 
NELDA P. JOHNSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GOLD'S GYM and PEAY INVESTMENT 
COMPANY 
Defendant. 
AMENDED NOTICE OF DEPOSITION: 
Candy Negrette 
Case No: 0504001206 PI 
Judge: Fred D. Howard 
Notice is hereby given that Plaintiff Nelda P. Johnson will take the deposition of the 
defendant Candy Negrette on Thursday, February 01, 2007, beginning at 12:00 p.m. at the office of 
Johnson Law Associates, 345-B East University Parkway, Orem, Utah. Said deposition will be taken 
before a certified court reporter. 
Dated this '? & day of January, 2007. 
JOHNSON LAW ASSOCIATES 
3 
/ ) , 4^Wl( /-
S. Austin Johnson / 
Attorney for Plaintiff Nelda P. Johnson 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this $0 day of January. 2007, a true and correct copy of this Notice of 
Taking deposition of Head of Gold Gym was mailed, postage prepaid to the following: 
Scott T. Evans 
Heather L. Thuet 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. 
50 S. Main Street, Ste 1500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84144 
Depomax Reporting Service 
333 S. Rio Grande 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
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S. Austin Johnson (USB# 5179) 
JOHNSON LAW ASSOCIATES 
345-B East University Parkway 
Orem, Utah 84058 
Tel: (801)426-7900 
Fax:(801)805-4815 
Attorney for Plaintiff Nelda P. Johnson 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DIVISION STATE OF UTAH 
NELDA P. JOHNSON, ] 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. ] 
GOLD'S GYM and PEAY INVESTMENT ' 
COMPANY 
Defendant. ] 
) AMENDED NOTICE OF DEPOSITION 
1 Lynette Felsted 
) Case No: 0504001206 PI 
) Judge: Fred D. Howard 
Notice is hereby given that Plaintiff Nelda P. Jolinson will take the deposition of the 
defendant Lisa Felsted on Thursday, February 01, 2007, beginning at 2:30 p.m. at the office of 
Johnson Law Associates, 345-B East University Parkway. Orem, Utah. Said deposition will be taken 
before a certified court reporter. 
Dated this ^O day of January, 2007. 
JOHNSON LAW ASSOCIATES 
S. Austin Jolinson / 
Attorney for Plaintiff Nelda P. Johnson 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this j>Q day of January, 2007, a true and correct copy of this Notice of 
Taking deposition of Head of Gold Gym was mailed, postage prepaid to the following: 
Scott T. Evans 
Heather L. Thuet 
CHRJSTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. 
50 S. Main Street, Ste 1500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84144 
Depomax Reporting Service 
333 S. Rio Grande 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
S. Austin Johnson (USB# 5179) 
JOHNSON LAW ASSOCIATES 
345-B East University Parkway 
Orem, Utah 84058 
Tel: (801)426-7900 
Fax:(801)805-4815 
Attorney for Plaintiff Nelda P. Johnson 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DIVISION STATE OF UTAH 
NELDA P. JOHNSON. ; 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. 
GOLD'S GYM and PEAY INVESTMENT 
COMPANY 
Defendant. ] 
) CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
) Case No: 0504001206 PI 
) Judge: Fred D. Howard 
COMES NOW S. Austm Johnson, attorney for Plaintiff, and hereby certifies that on the 30 
day of January, 2007, Amended Notice of Deposition of Nate Loftin, Candy Negrette, and Lynette 
Felsted, as well as a true and correct copy of thit. Certificate were sent via fax , email and mailed. 
postage prepaid to the following: 
Scott T. Evans 
Heather L. Thuet 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN. P.C. 
50 S. Main Street. Ste 1500 
Salt LaKe City. UT 84144 
Depomax Reporting Service 
333 S. Rio Grande 
Salt Lake Ctv. UT 84101 
*v* * i 2N1 
Dated this J6 day of January 2007. 
JOHNS LAW ASS<3t5IAT,ES 
S. Austin Johnson" 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this day $Q of January, 2007, a true and correct copy of this certificate 
of service was sent to the following: 
Scott T. Evans 
Heather L. Thuet 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN. P.C. 
50 S. Main Street. Ste 1500 
Salt Lake City. UT 84144 
Depomax Reporting Service 
333 S. Rio Grande 
Salt Lake City, UT 
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EXHIBIT B 
S. Austin Johnson (USB# 5179) 
JOHNSON LAW ASSOCIATES 
345-B East University Parkway 
Orem, Utah 84058 
Tel: (801)426-7900 
Fax:(801)805-4815 
Attorney for Plaintiff Nelda P. Johnson 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, AMERICAN FORK, STATE OF UTAH 
NELDA P. JOHNSON, ; 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ) 
GOLD'S GYM and PEAY INVESTMENT N 
COMPANY ) 
Defendants. ) 
) AMENDED NOTICE OF DEPOSITION 
) of Lynn Richard Tregeagle 
) Case No: 070102050 
i Judge: David N. Mortensen 
i Division 11 
Notice is hereby given that Plaintiff Nelda P. Johnson will take the deposition of the 
defendant Lynn Richard Tregeagle on Monday, June 11, 2007, beginning at 9:30 a.m. at the La 
Quinta Inn, Conference Room # 106,521 W. University Parkway, Orem, UT 84058. Said deposition 
will be taken before a certified court reporter from Depomax. 
Dated this [ day of June, 2007. 
JOHNSON LAW ASSOCIATES 
vS ftwthn Johnson IB 
S. Austin Johnson 
Attorney for Plaintiff Nelda P. Johnson 
JUH
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this *~l day of June, 2007, a true and correct copy of this Amended 
Notice of Deposition of Lynn Tregeagle was mailed, postage prepaid and via email to the 
following: 
Scott T. Evans 
Heather L. Thuet 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. 
15 West South Temple, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Depomax Reporting Service 
333 S. Rio Grande 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
S. Austin Johnson (USB# 5179) 
JOHNSON LAW ASSOCIATES 
345-B East University Parkway 
Orem, Utah 84058 
Tel: (801)426-7900 
Fax: (801) 805-4815 
Attorney for Plaintiff Nelda P. Johnson 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, AMERICAN FORK, STATE OF UTAH 
NELDA P. JOHNSON, ; 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. 
GOLD'S GYM and PEAY INVESTMENT ' 
COMPANY 
Defendants. ] 
) CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
) Case No: 070102050 
) Judge: David N. Mortensen 
) Division 11 
COMES NOW S. Austin Johnson, attorney for Plaintiff, and hereby certifies that on the 7th day of 
June, 2007, Amended Notice of Deposition of Lynn Richard Tregeagle, as well as a true and correct 
copy of this Certificate were sent by prepaid U.S postage from Orem, UT to the following: 
Heather L. Thuet 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. 
15 West South Temple, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Dated this ' day of June, 2007. 
JOHNS LAW ASSOCIATES 
S. Austin Johnson 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
EXHIBIT C 
Scott T.Evans, USB #6218 
Heather L. Thuet, USB #10106 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Telephone: (801)323.5000 
Facsimile: (801)323.9037 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DIVISION, STATE OF UTAH 
NELDA P. JOHNSON, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
GOLD'S GYM and PEAY INVESTMENT 
COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
DEFENDANTS' FIRST SET OF 
REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION 
TO PLAINTIFF 
Case No.: 0504001206 PI 
Judge: Fred D. Howard 
Pursuant to Rule 36(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the defendants, by and through 
their counsel of record, hereby submits the following Requests for Admission, to the plaintiff, to be 
answered in writing and under oath within 30 days of the date of service hereof. PLEASE TAKE 
NOTICE THAT ALL MATTERS IN THESE REQUESTS SHALL BE DEEMED ADMITTED 
PURSUANT TO RULE 36 OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE UNLESS A 
RESPONSE IS SUBMITTED WITHIN 30 DAYS AFTER SERVICE OF THIS REQUEST. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS 
REQUEST NO. 1: Admit that you applied for membership with Gold's Gym on 
7/7/04. 
REQUEST NO. 2: Admit that in applying for membership with Gold's Gym you 
were provided with and executed the "Membership Agreement" page 1 of 2 attached hereto as 
Exhibit "A" on 7/7/04. 
REQUEST NO. 3: Admit that your membership with Gold's Gym began on 7/7/04. 
REQUEST NO. 4: Admit that the document titled "Assumption of Risk and Risk of 
Accident" page 2 of 2 attached hereto as Exhibit "B" was printed on the reverse side of 
"Membership Agreement" page 1 of 2. 
REQUEST NO. 5: Admit that the attached "Membership Agreement" page 
1 of 2 (at about the middle of the page under Notice) contains your signature. 
REQUEST NO. 6: Admit that you signed the attached "Membership 
Agreement" page 1 of 2 (at about the middle of the page under Notice). 
REQUEST NO. 7: Admit that by signing the attached document titled 
""Membership Agreement" page 1 of 2 you represented you had read the document and agreed to 
the terms and conditions contained therein. 
REQUEST NO. 8: Admit that by signing the attached document titled "Assumption 
of Risk and Risk of Accident" page 2 of 2 you represented you had read the document and agreed to 
the terms and conditions contained therein. 
REQUEST NO. 9: Admit that you signed the attached document titled 
"Assumption of Risk and Risk of Accident" page 2 of 2 on July 7, 2004. 
REQUEST NO. 10: Admit that the attached document titled "Assumption of Risk 
and Risk of Accident" page 2 of 2 contains your signature twice. 
REQUEST NO. 11: Admit that signing the attached documents titled 
"Membership Agreement" page 1 of 2 and "Assumption of Risk and Risk of Accident" page 
2 of 2 was a prerequisite to joining Gold's Gym. 
REQUEST NO. 12: Admit that the top portion of the attached "Membership 
Agreement" page 1 of 2 (Buyer's Name, Buyer's Mailing Address, Buyer's Employer. 
Occupation, How long on job, Work Phone, Driver's License, In case of emergency, 
Relationship to member, Address, Phone) was completed by you. 
REQUEST NO. 13: Admit that the attached "Membership Agreement" page 
1 of 2 was completed on 7/7/04. 
REQUEST NO. 14: Admit that you requested that four additional 
membership cards be issued under your membership to the following individuals: (1) S. 
Austin Johnson; (2) S. Andrew Johnson; (3) Justin Vance; and (4) Jeremy Pittard. 
REQUEST NO. 15: Admit that pursuant to the attached "Membership 
Agreement" page 1 of 2, you agreed to make 23 payments of $79.69. 
REQUEST NO. 16: Admit that under the attached document titled 
Membership Agreement" page 1 of 2 your membership began on 7/7/04 and renewed on 
7/7/06. 
REQUEST NO. 17: Admit that you did not complete, sign and deliver a written 
incident report regarding your alleged fall within 72 hours of July 12, 2004 to Gold's Gym. 
REQUEST NO. 18: Admit that the attached document titled Membership 
Agreement" page 1 of 2 and "Assumption of Risk and Risk of Accident" page 2 of 2 both 
contain a provision providing that the Member can cancel the contract within 3 business 
days. 
REQUEST NO. 19: Admit that you renewed your membership with Gold's 
Gym on 6/8/06 for a term of two years beginning on 7/7/06 and renewing on 7/7/08. 
DATED this 5 ^ ^ day of January, 2007 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. 
Scott T. Evans 
Heather L. Thuet 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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Scott T.Evans, USB #6218 
Heather L. Thuet, USB #10106 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Telephone: (801) 323.5000 
Facsimile: (801)323.9037 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DIVISION, STATE OF UTAH 
NELDA P. JOHNSON, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
GOLD'S GYM and PEAY INVESTMENT 
COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
OF FIRST SET OF REQUESTS FOR 
ADMISSION TO PLAINTIFF 
Case No.: 0504001206 PI 
Judge: Fred D. Howard 
The Court is hereby notified that DEFENDANTS' FIRST SET OF REQUESTS FOR 
ADMISSION TO PLAINTIFF and this CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE were submitted by 
defendant(s) through its attorneys of record, in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
on this _^_"day of January, 2007 by mailing the same, postage prepaid, to the following: 
S. Austin Johnson 
Johnson Law Firm, P.C. 
345B East University Parkway 




Scott T Evans, USB #6218 
Heather L Thuet. USB # 1010c 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN. P C 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Telephone (801) 323.5000 
Facsimile (801)323 9037 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DIVISION, STATE OF UTAH 
NELDA P. JOHNSON, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
GOLD'S GYM and PEAY INVESTMENT 
COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
DEFENDANT GOLD GYM'S RESPONSE 
TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF 
INTERROGATORIES AND REQUEST 
FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 
Case No/ 0504001206 PI 
Judge Fred D. Howard 
Defendant, Gold's Gym, pursuant to Rules 26, 33 and 34 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, hereby responds to plaintiffs interrogatories and requests for production 
of documents as follows: 
GENERAL OBJECTIONS 
1. Gold's Gym objects to the definitions propounded by Plaintiff to the 
extent they conflict with or impose a greater burden upon Gold's Gym than would 
otherwise be imposed by Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and associated 
discovery rules. 
2. This case is in its infancy and many of the interrogatories and requests for 
production seek information pertaining to the identity of witnesses to be called at trial or 
the identification of documents and other tangible things to be used as exhibits at trial It 
is premature to be requesting such information and Gold's Gym reserves the nght to 
supplement its responses to such interrogatories and request for production of documents 
as discovery continues 
3. Some of the interrogatories and request for production of documents are 
so broad in scope they invade the attorney/client and attorney work product pnvileges 
and, accordingly, Gold's Gym objects to them 
INTERROGATORIES 
INTERROGATORY NO. 1: Give the following information concerning the 
person's full name, telephone number address [sic], and position with the company who 
provided any information m answenng these interrogators or in producing any 
documents in response to the Request for Production of Documents 
RESPONSE: Troy Peterson, Vice President of Gold's Gym, and IMandy 
Bynum, Executive Assistant for Gold's Gym of Utah, 
INTERROGATORY NO. 2: State the names and addresses of all persons 
known or believed by the Defendant to have paved, patched, or repaired the sidewalk or 
parking lot of the premises at the Gold's Gym property m Provo where the accident took 
place 
RESPONSE: Gold's Gym objects to this question as vague, ambiguous, and 
overly broad. It is not reasonably limited in scope, subject matter or 
reasonable timeframe. Subject to and without waiving this objection, Gold's 
Gym is in the process of attempting to locate documents responsive to this 
request and will provide such documents when they are found* 
2 
INTERROGATORY NO. 3: Describe, in detail, everything action taken by-
Defendant to improve safety for their customer's and pedestnans on defendant's premises 
before and after the Plaintiff was injured. 
RESPONSE: Gold's Gym objects to this question as vague, ambiguous, and 
overly broad. It is not limited in scope, subject matter, location or 
reasonable timeframe. Moreover, Interrogatory No. 3 is not likely to lead to 
the discovery of admissible evidence. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 4: Describe any preventive maintenance, 
evaluation and engineering provided by defendant to make sure its properties are safe for 
business invites at all of its different locations; and the location where the accident 
happened in Provo, UT. 
RESPONSE: Gold's Gym objects to this question as vague, ambiguous, and 
overly broad. It is not limited in scope, subject matter, location or 
reasonable timeframe. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 5: Describe specifically, and in detail any warning, 
signs, paint, or devise that warns patrons to be careful of the deep cracks in the pavement 
in the parking lot at Gold's Gym where the accident occurred. Describe in detail what 
you have done to repair the pavement, to determine whether it creates a risk of hazard to 
patrons, or to determine whether the pavement in its condition at the time of the accident 
was safe and not in need of repair. 
RESPONSE: Gold's Gym denies that there were any "deep cracks" in the 
pavement in the parking lot at 470 N. 900 E. in Provo, Utah. Gold's Gym further 
asserts that even if such "deep cracks" existed, it denies that such cracks created a 
3 
dangerous condition or were hidden from view. Accordingly, no warning signs or 
warnings to patrons were needed. 
See Response to Interrogatory No. 7, 8,10,11, and Request for Production of 
Documents No. 1 and 4. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 6: Did defendant observe the alleged condition at 
any time poor to the time plaintiff was injured? If so, when did defendant first observe 
said conditions? 
RESPONSE: Gold's Gym is unable to formulate a response to Interrogatory 
No. 6 because the question is so vague and ambiguous. Plaintiff cannot even 
identify or specifically describe what condition she alleges caused her to trip. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 7: Please identify any of defendant's discoverable 
information regarding the maintenance and repair's of the premise where the accident 
took place 
RESPONSE: Gold's Gym objects to this question as vague, ambiguous, and 
overly broad. It is not limited in scope, subject matter, location or 
reasonable timeframe. Subject to and without waiving this objection, see 
Gold's Gym's Rule 26 Initial Disclosures and Response to Interrogatory No. 
2. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 8: Identify any individuals who, according to your 
knowledge or belief, may have relevant discoverable information on the maintenance and 
repairs of the premise where accident took place, and on the company-wide maintenance 
program for premises, parking lots, approaches and sidewalks 
4 
RESPONSE: Gold's Gym objects to this question as vague, ambiguous, and 
overly broad. It is not limited in scope, subject matter, location or 
reasonable timeframe. Subject to and without waiving this objection, see 
Gold's Gym's Rule 26 Initial Disclosures and Response to Interrogatory No. 
2. Additionally, the manager of Gold's Gym Provo, Candy Negrette and the 
head of maintenance, Nate Loftin may have relevant discoverable 
information on the maintenance and repairs of the parking lot at 470 N. 900 
E. in Provo, Utah. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 9: Descnbe any reports of accidents, tripping of 
persons, or slip and falls that have occurred m the parking lot at Gold's Gym in Provo 
RESPONSE: Gold's Gym objects to this as it is not reasonably limited in 
scope, subject matter, location or time. Moreover, Interrogatory No. 9 is not likely 
to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Subject to and without waiving this 
objection Gold's Gym responds as follows: aside from plaintiff, there have been two 
reports of accidents, tripping or slip and falls that may have occurred in the Gold's 
Gym parking lot located at 470 N. 900 E. in Provo, Utah. On 9/17/97 an individual 
claimed to have tripped on a rug outside of gym and on 6/9/99 an individual claimed 
to have sprained his ankle, although it is unknown if the injury was claimed to have 
occurred in the parking lot or in the facility. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 10: State the name and the address of every 
maintenance provider or any other person with whom you have worked on the pavement 
or repairs to the premise entry and parking lot for the five years preceding the incident 
Descnbe what was done to improve and fix the entry, sidewalk, and parking lot pavement 
5 
for the secunty of the patrons In so doing, provide the dates and reasons for each work 
done 
RESPONSE: Gold's Gym objects to this question as vague, ambiguous, and 
overly broad. It is not limited in scope, subject matter, location or 
reasonable timeframe. Subject to and without waiving this objection, see 
Gold's Gym's Rule 26 Initial Disclosures and Response to Interrogatory No. 
2. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 11: Please state each expense incurred by you in 
fixing the crack or hazards that cause any prior incident, the purpose for which the 
expense was incurred, and to whom it was paid 
RESPONSE: Gold's Gym objects to this question as vague, ambiguous, and 
overly broad. It is not limited in scope, subject matter, location or 
reasonable timeframe. Subject to and without waiving this objection, Gold's 
Gym's denies fixing any "crack hazard that caused any prior incident" in 
Gold's Gym parking lot located at 470 N. 900 E. in Provo, Utah. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 12: If you are going to call any expert witness, set 
forth the areas of their expertise, identify any facts provided to assist them as a part of 
their basis for their opinions, and, provide a summary of the experts opinions as they 
relate to this case 
RESPONSE: Gold's Gym has not yet determined whether it will call an 
expert to testify on it's behalf at the trial of this matter nor, if so, the identity 
of any such expert. The requested information will be provided in 
accordance with the scheduling order entered by the court. 
6 
INTERROGATORY NO, 13: If you are going to call any fact witnesses, set 
forth the areas of their personal observation, knowledge or information that make them 
able to testify and describe their full opinion that may be offered at trial. 
RESPONSE: Gold's Gym objects to this request as premature, as it has not 
yet determined which, if any, of the persons identified in Defendant's Rule 26 
Initial Disclosures or those persons it has deposed it will call to testily at trial. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 14: Identify each location owned by Peay 
Investment Company within or without the state of Utah, the number of patrons each 
location accommodates; and identify any employee, contractor or manager who is in 
charge of providing a safe place for the patrons at each location. 
RESPONSE: Gold's Gym objects to this question as vague, ambiguous, and 
overly broad. It is not limited in scope, subject matter, location or 
reasonable timeframe* Moreover, Interrogatory No. 14 is not likely to lead to 
the discovery of admissible evidence and appears to be intended to harass 
and/or unreasonably increase the costs of litigation. Subject to and without 
waiving this objection, see attached Club Usage Reports from 10/18/2004. 
The manager of Gold's Gym Provo is Candy Negrette. Nate Loftin is the 
head of maintenance. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 1; Produce each and every repair bill 
related to the entry, sidewalk and parking lot pavement at the Gold's Gym in Provo, UT, 
that has been incurred in the past seven years. 
7 
RESPONSE: Gold's Gym objects to this question as reasonably limited in 
time. Moreover, Request for Production No. 1 appears to be intended to 
harass and/or unreasonably increase the costs of litigation. Subject to and 
without waiving this objection, see Response to Interrogatory No. 2. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 2: Provide a copy of each photograph, 
receipt, and bill which identifies any work done on the premise where accident occurred. 
RESPONSE: Gold's Gym objects to this question as vague, ambiguous, and 
overly broad. It is not reasonably limited in scope, subject matter, location 
or timeframe. Moreover, Interrogatory No. 14 is not likely to lead to the 
discovery of admissible evidence and appears to be intended to harass and/or 
unreasonably increase the costs of litigation. Gold's Gym also objects to 
Request for Production No. 2 to the extent that it calls for the disclosure of 
information protected by the attorney/client and attorney work/product 
privileges. Subject to and without waiving this objection, see Response to 
Interrogatory No. 2. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 3: Produce for inspection and copying all 
repair and improvement reports and/or records relating to this accident. 
RESPONSE: Gold's Gym objects to Request for Production No. 4 on the 
grounds that it is overly broad, unduly burdensome, and not reasonably 
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Gold's Gym also 
objects to Request for Production No. 4 to the extent that it calls for the 
disclosure of information protected by the attorney/client and attorney 
work/product privileges. Subject to and without waiving the foregoing 
8 
objections, Gold's Gym is unable to formulate a response to Request for 
Production No. 4 because plaintiff cannot even identify or specifically 
describe what condition she alleges caused her to trip. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 4: Produce for inspection and copying 
ANY DOCUMENT that may relate to, refer to, or constitute your answer to any 
interrogatory served on defendant simultaneously with these reports 
RESPONSE: Gold's Gym objects to Request for Production No. 5 on the 
grounds that it is unintelligible. No reports were served on defendant 
simultaneously with any interrogatory. Gold's Gym also objects to Request 
for Production No. 5 to the extent that it calls for the disclosure of 
information protected by the attorney/client and attorney work/product 
privileges. Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, see 
Response to Interrogatory No. 2. 
DATED this z?"22 day of January, 2007 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P C 
ScbttT EySns 
Heather L Thuet 
Attorneys for Defendant 
9 
VERIFICATION 
STATE OF \. 
LL\ZLU 
) ss: 
COUNTY OF ^ ' ^ v l ) 
_ being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says that 
^ 
he/she is authorized to execute this document on behalf of Gold's Gym. in the above-
entitled matter, that he/she has read the foregoing Response to Plaintiffs First Set of 
Interrogatones and Request for Production of Documents and that to the best of his/her 
knowledge, information and belief, he/she believes them to be true 
DATED this \ 1 day of N J A ^ U a ^ , 20Qg- ^(2JfeT % 
Subscnbed and sworn to before me this j ( day of - 0 &M**-o~>\ru , 2QQ&- 2- oo 
llg'Llii'l'lili1 i»imnw 
Notary pii&ijc 
Staft of Ittate 
My Commission Bxptm Oct 31,2009 
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L E A S E 
THIS LEASE is made and entered into this J r J day of p ^ / y u ^ y , 1995 by and 
between Peay Investment Corp., a Utah corporation ("Landlord") and Body Firm Aerobics, Inc., 
a Utah Corporation ("Tenant"). 
WITNESSETH: 
1. PREMISES 
1.1 Landlord hereby leases to Tenant all of those certain premises, including the 
building, structures, appurtenant parking lot and access and other improvements owned by 
Landlord now or hereafter located thereon together with the rights and appurtenances thereof, 
situated at ^10 North 900 East, Provo, Utah County, State of Utah, as more particularly 
described in "Exhibit "A" which exhibit is attached hereto and made a part hereof by reference 
(hereinafter referred to as the "Premises"). 
L2 Landlord, shall promptly commence and shall pursue with due diligence until 
completion, the improvement of the building and related structures and facilities, except floor 
coverings, to be constructed by Landlord and as more fully set forth on the plans and 
specifications attached hereto as Exhibits B-l and B-2, or such revisions, amendments or 
modifications thereto as shall be approved by Tenant, which approval shall not be unreasonably 
withheld (hereinafter referred to as the "Construction"). That portion of the Construction as is 
described on Exhibit B-l shall be performed by Landlord at Landlord's cost and expense. That 
portion of the Construction as is described on Exhibit B-2 shall be performed by Landlord at 
Tenant's cost and expense. The Construction shall use first class materials and shall be made 
and performed in a good and workmanlike manner and in accordance with all applicable laws, 
statutes, ordinances and building codes. —. 
1.3 It is acknowledged by the parties that the (^syW3l^>n to be performed by 
Landlord is in the approximate amount of^te^Hundred Fifty Thou^lduDollars ($150,000.00). 
This lease is contingent on Landlord securing financing acceptable to Landlord lor the costs of 
such Construction. Within thirty <1U| days of the execution of this 1 ease by Landlord and 
Tenant, Landlord shall make application for such financing and shall proceed with reasonable 
due diligence to complete the same. 
1.4 Landlord shall notify Tenant of the approximate date upon which the 
Construction will be Substantially Completed which date shall be on or before August 1, 1995. 
Landlord shall promptly notify Tenant of any subsequent changes to such date as soon as 
Landlord becomes aware of it. The date upon which the Construction is Substantially Completed 
shall be the "Premises Completion Date"; provided that if Substantial Completion is delayed 
because of any delay by Tenant, the Premises Completion Date shall be deemed to occur on the 
date when it would have occurred had there been no such delay by Tenant. The words 
"Substantially Completed" shall mean the date when: 
(a) The Construction has been completed (except for Punch List Items) 
in accordance with the plans and specifications; and 
(b) Landlord has obtained a certificate of occupancy permitting Tenant's 
use and enjoyment of the Premises for the purposes authorized by the Lease. 
1.5 Within ten (10) days after the Premises Completion Date, Landlord shall 
deliver to Tenant for Tenant's approval a current list ("Punch List1') of Punch List Items for the 
Premises that Landlord is obligated by the provisions of this Lease to complete. Within ten (10) 
days after receipt of the Punch List, Tenant shall notify Landlord of any additional Punch List 
Items which it requests Landlord to perform. Punch List Items, including such items requested 
by Tenant as Landlord agrees to perform, shall be completed by Landlord within (30) days after 
the Premises Completion Date. If Landlord has obtained a temporary certificate of occupancy 
Landlord shall, with due diligence, complete the remaining items of construction required to 
obtain, and shall thereupon obtain, a permanent certificate of occupancy for the Premises as 
required by law. The words "Punch List Items" shall mean details of construction, decoration, 
and mechanical and electrical adjustments which, in the aggregate, are minor in character and 
do not materially interfere with Tenant's use or enjoyment of the Premises in accordance with 
the provisions of this Lease. 
1.6 On the date upon which the Construction is Substantially completed, or such 
date prior thereto as Landlord shall consent, Tenant shall, at Tenant's cost, promptly commence 
and shall pursue with due diligence until completion to install or have installed the floor 
coverings and to otherwise prepare the Premises in accordance with Exhibit C (hereinafter 
referred to as the "Tenant's Work"). Prior to installation, leuauf slwll submit h» i^udloid for 
Landlord's approval, plans for and samples of the floor coverings to be installed by Tenant. If 
Landlord shall consent to the commencement of Tenants Work prior to the date of Substantial 
Completion of the Construction, Tenant's Work shall be performed at such time and in such 
manner as shall not delay the Construction. The Tenant's Work shall use first class materials 
and shall be performed in a good and workmanlike manner and in accordance with all applicable 
laws, statutes, ordinances and building codes. 
1.7 Unless requested by Landlord, as provided in Section 7 1, the Construction, 
including the Construction described on Exhibit B-2, and the Tenant's Work shall not be 
removed by Tenant at the expiration or earlier termination of the Term of this Lease, but such 
(instruction and Tenant's Work shall belong to Landlord without compensation to Tenant. 
2. LANDLORD'S TITLE 
2.1 Landlord represents and warrants that it is well seized of and has good and 
marketable title to the Premises in fee simple. Landlord agrees to defend said title and 
represents and warrants that, so long as Tenant fulfills the covenants and conditions of this Lease 
required by it to be kept and performed, Tenant shall have, throughout the entire term and any 
extension thereof, peaceful and quiet possession and enjoyment of the Premises. Landlord 
further represents and warrants that it has good right, full power and lawful authority to make 
this Lease for the term herein specified and any extension thereof. 
3. TERM 
3.1 The Premises are leased for a term (the "Term") winch shall commence on 
the date of execution hereof and shall end on the date which is thirty HO) years after the 
Commencement Date (hereinafter defined). For purposes of this Lease the term "Expiration 
Date" shall mean the date wliich is thirty (30) years followmg the Commencement Date, or such 
earlier date on which this Lease terminates pursuant to the terms hereof. Promptly following 
the Commencement Date, Landlord and Tenant shall execute a written instrument which shall 
stt forth the Commencement Dale and Expiration Date of die Term of this Lease. 
4 RFNi 
4.1 Tenant's obligation to pay rent shall begin on the earlier of (aj the first day 
after (i) the Premises Completion Date and (ii) the dale ihat i .mdlord deln en possession to the 
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Tenant or (b) August 1, 1995 (the "Commencement Date"). From and after the Commencement 
Date, rental payments shall be due on the first day of each month during the Term of this Lease. 
The amount of the monthly rental payments, subject to adjustment as hereinafter provided, shall 
be Five Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($5,500.00). If the Commencement Date should occur 
on a day other than the first day of a calendar month, or the Expiration Date should occur on 
a day other than the last day of a calendar month, then the rental for such fractional month shall 
be prorated upon a daily basis based upon a thirty (30) day calendar month. 
4.2 On the fifth anniversary of the Commencement Date and on each anniversary 
of the Commencement Date thereafter during the Term the monthly rent shall be adjusted. The 
adjusted monthly rent shall be determined by multiplying the monthly rent due for the year prior 
to the^niyersary date by One Hundred Three percent (103%), 
4.2,1 Landlord shall send Tenant a Rent Adjustment Statement setting 
forth the determination of the adjustment in the monthly rent. Until such time as Tenant has 
received such statement, Tenant shall continue to pay the monthly rent previously required 
hereunder. The increase in the monthly rent during die period of time prior to receipt of such 
Rent Adjustment Statement shall be paid by Tenant to Landlord upon receipt of such statement. 
4.3 If any installment of rent or any other sum due from the Tenant shall not be 
received by the Landlord or the Landlord's designee within Five (5) days after such amount shall 
be due, Tenant shall pay to Landlord a late charge equal to fcifty Dollars ($50.00) per day until 
said payment and late charges are received. The parties hereby agree that such late charge 
represents a fair and reasonable estimate of the costs that the Landlord will incur by reason of 
late payment by the Tenant- In addition such late payment shall bear interest at the rate of 
eighteen percent (18%) per annum from the due date thereof. 
5. RENT AND SECURITY DEPOSIT 
5.1 Upon execution of this Lease Agreement by Landlord and Tenant, Tenant 
shall deposit with Landlord the sum of Five Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($5,500.00) which 
is the first month rent under the provisions of Section 4.1. 
5.2 As security for the faithful performance of the terms, covenants and 
conditions of this Lease, Tenant shall deposit with Landlord, upon execution of this Lease 
Agreement, an additional sum of Five Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($5,500.00). In the 
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hereunder. The increase in the monthly rent during the period of time prior to receipt of such 
Rent Adjustment Statement shall be paid by Tenant to Landlord upon receipt of such statement. 
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received by the Landlord or the Landlord's designee within five (5) days after such amount shall 
be due, Tenant shall pay to Landlord a late charge equal to tnfty Dollars ($50.00) per day until 
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represents a fair and reasonable estimate of the costs that the Landlord will incur by reason of 
late payment by the Tenant. In addition such late payment shall bear interest at the rate of 
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5 RENT AND SECURITY DEPOSIT 
5.1 Upon execution of this Lease Agreement by Landlord and Tenant, Tenant 
shall deposit with Landlord the sum of Five Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($5,500.00) which 
is the first month rent under the provisions of Section 4.1. 
5.2 As security (or ihe faithful performance ol the tains, covenants and 
conditions of this Lease, Tenant shall deposit with Landlord, upon execution of this Lease 
Agreement, an additional sum of Five Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($5,500.00). In the 
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event Tenant shall default in the performance of any term or provision of this Lease, Landlord 
may use or apply such security to the payment of any rent of Tenant, any sums which Landlord 
may expend or be required to expend as a result of Tenant's default or for any damages of 
Tenant as a result of Tenant's default. No such use or application of the security shall be 
deemed to cure the Tenant's default, but Tenant shall be deemed in default until Tenant shall 
have cured the default and/or replaced the security deposit. In the event Tenant shall not default 
in the performance of this Lease, then the security deposit shall be returned to Tenant, without 
interest, after the expiration of the Lease and re-delivery of the Premises to Landlord. 
6. USE OF THE PREMISES 
6.1 Tenant shall use the Premises for the purpose of conducting the business of 
aerobics, weight and fitness training and classes, selling merchandise, tanning salon, day care 
and juice bar. Tenant shall not use or allow the Premises to be used for any other purpose 
without the prior written consent of Landlord, which consent shall not unreasonably be withheld, 
nor in any event shall Tenant use or allow the Premises to be used for any unlawful purpose. 
6.2 Tenant shall comply with all laws, ordinances and regulations of any federal, 
state, county, municipal or other lawful authority in connection with its occupancy of the 
Premises and all rules relating to alteration, improvement or development of the Premises. 
7. IMPROVEMENTS AND ALTERATIONS AND SIGNS 
7.1 Tenant shall not improve, alter or modify the Premises in any manner without 
the prior written consent of Landlord, which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld. Prior 
to seeking such approval, Tenant shall submit to Landlord written plans and specifications 
including the plan for financing of any such improvements and alterations. If Landlord shall 
consent to any improvements or alterations, Tenant shall promptly commence and shall pursue 
with due diligence to completion the making of such improvements or alterations. Tenant's 
improvements or alternations shall use first class materials and shall be made and performed in 
a workmanlike manner and in compliance with all federal, state and municipal laws and 
regulations. All improvements or alterations erected, installed, or made by Tenant including the 
Tenant's Work shall become part of the Premises and, upon expiration or sooner termination of 
this Lease shall belong to Landlord without compensation to Tenant. If Landlord shall require 
the removal of any improvements, alterations or the Tenant's Work, Tenant shall repair all 
damages to the Premises caused by such removal. The consent of the Landlord to make 
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improvements, alterations or Tenant's Work shall not be construed as an authorization to Tenant 
that the Tenant make improvements, alterations or Tenant's Work on behalf of the Landlord and 
no lien or encumbrance arising out of the said improvements, alterations or Tenant's Work shall 
constitute a lien or encumbrance on the interest of the Landlord in the Premises. Tenant agrees 
not to permit any lien or encumbrance for monies owing by Tenant whetfier from the 
improvements, alteradons, Tenant's Work or otherwise, to remain against the Tenant's interest 
in the Premises for a period of more than thirty (30) days. 
7.2 Tenant may place suitable signs on die Premises lor the purpose oi indicating 
Hit natmc uj the business carried on by the Tenant in said Premises; provided, however, that 
such signs and their location shall be in keeping with other signs in the district where die 
Premises are located, shall conform with any Provo City Sign Code and shall be approved in 
advance by Landlord. Damage to Uie Premises caused by the removal of such signs at die 
termination of this Lease shall be repaired by Tenant. 
7.3 Tenant shall be responsible for any alteration, repair or improvement to the 
Premises required by ordinance, regulation or requirement of any governmental agency, which 
is effective or becomes effective during the Term of this Lease. 
8. MAINTENANCE AND REPAIRS 
8.1 At Landlord's sole cost and expense, Landlord shall keep and maintain the 
roof and roof structure in good order, condition and repair' normal wear and use excepted. 
8.2 At Tenant's sole cost and expense, Tenant shall keep and maintain the 
Premises and all improvements thereon including the exterior, parking lot, plumbing, sewer, 
electrical, heating and air conditioning systems in good order, condition and repair, normal wear 
and use excepted. Tenant shall comply with all public laws, ordinances and regulations from 
time to time applicable to the Premises. Tenant hereby waives any provision of law that it may 
make repairs at the expense of Landlord. At the end of the Term of this Lease Tenant shall 
return possession of the Premises to Landlord in good order, condition and repair. 
9, FORCE MAJEURE 
J. 1 In the event either party is unable practicably to make or complete any repair, 
alteration or maintenance required of such party hereunder because of difficulty in obtaining 
labor or materials, or because of any law or regulation, labor dispute, or any otiier cause beyond 
such party's control, such party shall not, as a result thereof, be in breach of any such duty 
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hereunder, and shall not be liable to the other party for any damages resulting therefrom, in any 
such event, the time limit for the performance of any such duty shall be extended for a period 
which is reasonable in light of such delay. Except as provided in Section 15.4, Tenant shall pay 
the rent required under this Lease during any such period of delay. 
10. UTILITIES 
10.1 From and after the Commencement Date Tenant shall pay all charges for 
water, gas, heat, electricity, power, telephone service and all other utilities used in, upon or 
about the Premises. 
11. TAXES AND ASSESSMENTS 
11.1 Tenant shall pay all real and personal property taxes, assessments and other 
charges levied or assessed against the Premises and its contents for any period all of which is 
included within the Term, and also its prorata share of all such taxes, assessments and other 
charges levied or assessed thereon for any period, part of which is included within the Term. 
11.2 Tenant shall have the right at Tenant's sole cost and expense to contest the 
legality or validity of any taxes, assessments or other public charges which are to be paid by 
Tenant hereunder, however, notwithstanding such contest, Tenant shall continue to pay to 
Landlord the monthly payment of such tax assessments or other charges as provided in Section 
13.2* Upon final determination of such contest, the amount necessary to discharge any judgment 
or decision rendered against Tenant, together with all costs and charges incidental thereto, shall 
be paid by Tenant. Such portion of such taxes as shall have been deposited with Landlord under 
the provisions of this section shall be paid by Landlord from such deposits. Landlord shall, at 
the request of Tenant, execute, or join in the execution of any instrument or document necessary 
in connection with any such contest. Tenant shall indemnify and hold Landlord harmless against 
and from any liability resulting from Tenant having contested any such tax, assessment or other 
charge. 
12. INSURANCE AND INDEMNITY 
12.1 Except as otherwise expressly provided herein, Tenant shall indemnify and 
hold Landlord harmless against and from any loss, damage or injury to the Premises or to any 
person at any time occasioned by or arising out of (a) any act, activity or omission of Tenant 
or of any of its employees; or (b) the occupancy or use of the Premises or any part thereof by 
or under Tenant and any condition existing at or upon the Premises. 
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12.2 Landlord shall, at Tenant's sole cost and expense, keep or cause to be kept 
the building and structures upon the Premises insured by an insurance carrier licensed to do 
business in the State of Utah, *uid rated A: AAA or better by Best's Insurance Guide, against loss 
or damage by tire, flood and such other casualties as are normally included in a Cause of Loss -
Broad Form Insurance Policy, including vandalism and malicious mischief, in an amount not less 
than the lull replacement cost of the building (which is determined at this time to be Six 
Hundred Thousand Dollars ($600,000.00)) and covering both single and multiple occurrences, 
and including an endorsement for Landlord's loss of rent or business income loss in an amount 
at least equal to the rent payable hereunder. Landlord may re-evaluate the value of the Premises 
and improvements and request a reasonable increase in the coverage afforded hereunder. Any 
such insurance policy shall provide that the proceeds thereof shall be payable to Landlord to be 
held and used by Landlord for reconstruction of the Premises as hereinafter provided, or in the 
case of payment under a rent loss or business income loss endorsement to pay or apply the same 
to the rent due to the Landlord hereunder. 
12.3 Tenant shall, at Tenant's sole cost and expense, keep or cause to be kept 
its equipment, trade fixtures, furnishings, inventory and other personal property located upon 
the Premises insured by an insurance carrier licensed to do business in the State of Utah, and 
rated A:AAA or better by Best's Insurance Guide, against loss or damage by fire, flood and 
such other casualties as are normally included m a Cause of Loss -Broad Form Insurance Policy, 
including vandalism and malicious mischief, in an amount not less than the full replacement cost 
of such personal property. Any such insurance policy shall provide that the proceeds thereof 
shall be the property of Landlord as its interests shall appear, including without limitation its 
rights under Section 18.4. 
12.4 Tenant shall maintain in full force a policy of comprehensive liability 
insurance, including bodily injury and property damage, written by one or more responsible 
insurance companies licensed to do business in the State of Utah and rated A: AAA or better by 
Best's Insurance Guide, which will insure the parties against liability for injury to persons and/or 
property and/or death of any person or persons occurring in or about the Premises. Such 
comprehensive liability insurance shall afford protection to the hinii ul not less than 
$1,000,000,00 in respect to bodily injury or death and/or damage to proper!) resulting from an 
(single) occurrence. Every five years following the commencement date, Landlord may re-
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evaluate the insurance coverage provided hereunder and request a reasonable increase in the 
coverage afforded hereunder. 
12.5 Tenant shall maintain and keep in force all workmen's compensation 
insurance with respect to its employees required under the laws of the State of Utah. 
12.6 All policies of insurance required hereunder shall be obtained on or before 
the Commencement Date and shall include Landlord, and Landlord's mortgagee, as additional 
insureds as their interests may appear, and a provision that the insurer waives the right of 
subrogation against Landlord, its agents, representatives and mortgagee. A certificate for each 
of such policies shall be delivered to Landlord. At least thirty (30) days before the expiration 
of each such policy, Tenant shall furnish Landlord with appropriate proof of the issuance of a 
policy continuing in force the insurance covered by the policies so expiring. 
12.7 Should Tenant fail, refuse or neglect to deposit with Landlord adequate 
proof that it has caused to be insured and kept in force the insurance required and agreed herein, 
Landlord shall have the right, at its option, to effect such insurance, as herein required of Tenant 
including being named as additional insured and waiver of subrogation. Any premiums therefore 
paid by Landlord shall be treated as additional rent which shall be due and payable with interest 
at the rate of eighteen percent (18%) per annum by Tenant on the first day of the month next 
succeeding the date upon which such premiums shall be paid by Landlord. 
12.8 Tenant hereby waives all claims against the Landlord for damages or losses 
sustained by Tenant to equipment, trade fixtures, inventory, any personal property or otherwise, 
or for injury to persons in and upon the Premises from any cause whatsoever. 
13. MONTHLY DEPOSIT FOR TAXES AND INSURANCE 
13.1 On the first day of each month during the Term of this Lease or any 
Extended Term hereof Tenant shall pay to Landlord a sum equal to the amount of the real estate 
taxes and assessments for the Premises and of any insurance premiums required to be paid to 
Landlo£d_hereunder that will next become due and payable divided by the number of months to 
elapse prior to one month before such taxes, assessments and insurance premiums shall become 
due and payable. The amount to be payable each year shall be estimated by Landlord based 
upon the amounts payable during the preceding year. Such amounts shall be held by Landlord 
m tntsUo pay such taxes, assessments and msurance premiums. Interest shall not earn interest 
on such deposits nor shall such deposits be payable to Tenant. 
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13.2 If at the due date for payment of any such real estate taxes and assessments 
01 uwiuance premiums, the amount oa deposit with Landlord is insufficient to pay such taxes 
or premium, the Tenant shall pay to Landlord the amount of such insufficiency within ten (10) 
days of notification by Landlord of the amount of such insufficiency. At the end of each year 
of the Term, if the amount of the real estate taxes and assessments and insurance premiums paid 
exceed the amounts estimated by Landlord, and if Tenant has not previously paid such additional 
amount as provided above, then Tenant shall within ten (10) days of notice by Landlord, pay 
to Landlord the amount by which the real estate taxes and assessments and insurance premiums 
paid exceeded the amounts estimated by Landlord. Any amount remaining on deposit with 
Landlord at the end of any year of the Term, except the final year of the Term, shall continue 
to be held by Landlord under the terms of this Section 13. 
14 ASSIGNMENT AND SUBLETTING. 
14 1 Tenant shall not assign or sublet its rights or interests under this Lease 
without the prior written consent of Landlord. However, if the assignment or subletting, shall 
be of less than be of less than twenty five (25%) percent of the total area of the Building is for 
less than twenty-five (25%) percent of the normal business usage hours of the Premises, Tenant 
shall not be required to secure the prior written consent of Landlord, but will, if requested by 
Landlord, notify Landlord of any such assignment or subletting. In the event Tenant shall at any 
time assign its interest under this Lease or sublet the Premises and shall receive thereby a rental 
in excess of the rent provided herein, Landlord shall be entitled to such excess rent. 
15. DAMAGE OR DESTRUCTION 
15 1 Subject to the provisions of Section 15.3, if at any time during the Term 
the Premises are destroyed or damaged and either (a) such damage is not "substantial" as that 
term is hereinafter defined, or (b) such damage is covered by insurance proceeds received by 
Landlord, then Landlord shall promptly repair such damage, using such insurance proceeds as 
are received, and this Lease shall continue in full force and effect. Tenant shall immediately 
pay to Landlord the amount of all expenses of repair which are not covered by insurance 
proceeds. 
H } Sitbftvt to the provisions of Section 15.3, if at any time during the term 
hereof the Pienuscs are destroyed or damaged, and if such damage is "substantial" as that tenn 
is hereinafter defined, and if such damage was caused by a casualty not required to be insured 
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against under Section 12 then Landlord may at its option either (a) repair such damage as soon 
as reasonably possible at Landlord's expense, in which event this Lease shall continue in full 
force and effect, or (b) cancel and terminate this Lease as of the date of the occurrence of such 
damage, by giving Tenant written notice of its election to do so within sixty (60) days after the 
date of occurrence of such damage. In the event such damage or destruction is caused by the 
negligent or willful acts or omissions of Tenant, its agents, employees, customers or 
representatives, Tenant shall immediately pay to Landlord the amount of all expenses of repair. 
15.3 If the Premises are destroyed or damaged during the last twelve (12) months 
of the Term of this Lease and tlie estimated cost of repair exceeds ten percent (10%) of the 
monthly rent then remaining to be paid by Tenant for the balance of the Term, Landlord may 
at its option cancel and terminate this Lease as of the date of occurrence of such damage by 
giving Tenant written notice of its election to do so within thirty (30) days after the date of such 
damage. If Landlord shall not elect to terminate this Lease, the repair of such damage shall be 
governed by Section 15.1 or 15.2, as the case may be. 1 
15.4 If the Premises are destroyed or damaged and Landlord repairs or restores 
them pursuant to the provisions of this Section 15, Tenant shall continue the operation of its 
business in the Premises to the extent reasonably practicable from the standpoint of prudent 
business management; and the monthly rent payable hereunder for the period during which such 
damage, repair or restoration continues (or during the periocl when Tenant cannot conduct its 
business in the Premises, whichever is longer) shall be abated in proportion to the degree to 
which the Premises are rendered untenantable. The provisions hereof shall not be effective to 
prevent full payment of the monthly rent pursuant to the business income loss or rent loss 
endorsement in effect with respect to the insurance polices. There shall be no abatement of any 
type of additional rent or other monetary charge payable hereunder. Tenant shall have no claim 
against Landlord for any damages suffered by Tenant by reason of any such damage, 
destruction, repair or restoration. If Landlord shall be obligated to repair or restore tlie 
Premises under these provisions of this Article and shall not commence such repair or restoration 
within one hundred and twenty (120) days after such obligations shall accrue (which shall be 
deemed to be the date on which tlie insurance carrier acknowledges liability and Fixes the amount 
payable to Landlord) Tenant may at its option cancel and terminate this Lease as of the date 
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Tenant vacates the Premises by giving Landlord written notice of its election to do so at any 
time prior to the commencement of such repair or restoration. 
15.5 For the purpose of this Section 15, "substantial" damage to the Premises 
shall be deemed to be damage, the estimated cost of repair of which exceeds twenty percent 
(20%) of the then estimated replacement cost ot the building and improvements. The 
determination in good faith by Landlord of the estimated cost of repair of any damage and/or 
the estimated replacement cost of the building shall be conclusive for the purpose hereof. 
1 f\ EMINENT DOMAIN 
J ft. 1 In the event all of the Premises shall be appropriated or taken under the 
power of eminent domain by any public or quasi-public authority, or by reason oi a purchase 
under threat thereof, this Lease shall terminate and expire as of the date of such taking. 
16.2 In the event (a) any portion of the building on the Premises is taken or (b) 
more than twenty percent (20%) of the area of the Premises utilized by Tenant for driveways 
and parking is taken, or (c) direct access from the Premises to any adjacent public street or 
highway is cut-off, under the power of eminent domain by any public or quasi-public authority, 
or by reason of a purchase under threat thereof, either party shall have the right to terminate this 
Lease as of the date of such taking upon giving the other party written notice of such election 
within thirty (30) days after the date of written notice to such party that the Premises are to be 
so appropriated or taken. Landlord shall notify Tenant of any •contemplated appropriation within 
its knowledge. If neither party shall elect to so terminate this Lease, then Landlord shall, at 
Landlord's cost and expense, immediately restore the Premises to a complete unit of like quality 
and character as existed prior to such appropriation or taking. Rent shall be abated from the 
date of any such taking to the date restoration is completed, and, thereafter, there shall be a 
prorata abatement of rent based upon the extent to which the size of the Premises has been 
reduced. 
16.3 If this Lease is terminated in accordance with either Section 16.1 or Section 
16.2, Landlord shall be entitled to the entire award or compensation in such proceedings, 
including without limitation, any award made for the value of the leasehold estate or any other 
rights of Tenant created or existing under this Lease. Tenant shall be entitled to (a) the portion 
of the award, if any, made for the taking or appropriation of Tenant's Fixtures, furnishings, 
equipment or other personal property; and (b) such sumt if an\ received by way of award or 
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negotiation to compensate Tenant for interference with its business or relocation. The rent for 
the last month of Tenant's occupancy shall be prorated. 
17. HOLDING OVER 
17.1 Should Tenant for any reason remain in possession of the Premises, or any 
part thereof, after the expiration of the Term with the consent, express or implied, of Landlord, 
such holding over shall constitute a tenancy from month to month only, upon the same 
conditions and at the same rental as herein set forth. 
18. DEFAULT AND REMEDIES 
18.1 The occurrence of any of the following shall constitute a material default and 
breach of this Lease by the Tenant: 
(a) Nonpayment. Any failure by the Tenant to pay when due any rent or 
other monetary sums required to be paid by the Tenant hereunder; 
(b) Abandonment. The abandonment or vacation of the Premises by the 
Tenant; 
(c) Nonobservance or Nonperformance. A failure by the Tenant to 
observe or perform any other provision of this Lease to be observed or performed by the 
Tenant, if such failure continues for twenty (20) days after written notice thereof to the Tenant, 
provided, however, that if the nature of the default is such that the same cannot reasonably be 
cured within said twenty (20) day period, the Tenant shall not be deemed to be in default if the 
Tenant shall within such period commence such cure and thereafter diligently prosecute the same 
to completion; 
(d) Insolvency. The making by Tenant of any general assignment or 
general arrangement for the benefit of creditors; the fding by or against Tenant of a petition to 
have Tenant adjudged a bankrupt or of a petition for reorganization or arrangement under any 
law relating to bankruptcy (unless, in the case of a petition filed against Tenant, the same is 
dismissed within thirty (30) days); the appointment of a trustee or receiver to take possession 
of substantially all of the Tenant's assets located at the Premises or the Tenant's interest in this 
Lease; or the attachment execution, or other judicial seizure of Tenant's assets located at the 
Premises or of the Tenant's interest in this Lease. 
18.2 Nonexclusive Remedies. In the event of any material default or breach by 
the Tenant under this Lease, the Landlord shall have the following nonexclusive remedies: 
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(a) Continuation. At its option and without waiving any default by the 
Tenant, the Landlord shall have the right to continue this Lease in full force and effect and to 
collect all rent, additional rent, and other fees to be paid by the Tenant hereunder as and when 
due I hiring any period that the I enant is in default hereunder, the Landlord shall have the 
right, pursuant to legal proceedings or pursuant to any notice provided for by law, to enter and 
take possession of the Premises, without terminating this Lease, for the purpose of reletting said 
Premises or any part thereof and making any alterations and repairs that may be necessary or 
desirable in connection with such reletting. Any such reletting or relettings may be for such 
term or terms (including periods that would exceed the remaining term hereof), and at such rent 
or rents, and upon such other terms and conditions as the Landlord may in its sole discretion 
deem advisable. Upon each and any such reletting, the rents received by the Landlord from 
such reletting shall be applied as follows: First to the payment of any indebtedness (other than 
rent) due hereunder from the Tenant to the Landlord; second to payment of costs and expenses 
of such reletting, including brokerage fees, attorneys' fees, court costs, and costs of any 
alterations or repairs; third to the payment of rent, and other amounts due and unpaid hereunder; 
and fourth, the residue, if any, shall be held by the Landlord and applied in payment of future 
rent, and other amounts as the same become due and payable hereunder. If the rent or rents 
received during any month and applied as provided above shall be insufficient to cover all such 
amounts including the rent, and other amounts to be paid hereunder by the Tenant for such 
month, the Tenant shall pay to the Landlord any such deficiency; such deficiencies shall be 
calculated and applied monthly. No entry or taking possession of the Premises by the Landlord 
shall be construed as an election by the Landlord to terminate this Lease, unless the Landlord 
gives written notice of such election to the Tenant or unless such termination shall be decreed 
by a court of competent jurisdiction. Notwithstanding any reletting by the Landlord without 
termination, the Landlord may at any time thereafter terminate this Lease for such previous 
default by giving written notice thereof to the Tenant. 
(b) Termination. The Landlord shall have the right, at its option, to 
terminate this Lease and the Tenant's right to possession hereunder by giving notice thereof to 
the Tenant, in which case this Lease shall terminate and the Tenant shall immediately surrender 
possession of the Premises to the Landlord. In such event the Landlord shall be entitled to 
recover from the Tenant all damages incurred by the Landlord by reason of the Tenant's default, 
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19. PAYMENTS AND NOTICES 
19.1 All rents and other sums payable by Tenant to Landlord shall be paid at the 
address provided below. Any notices to be given or other document to be delivered by either 
party to the other hereunder may be deposited in the United States Mail, duly registered or 
certified, with postage prepaid, and simultaneously mailed, postage prepaid in the regular United 
States Mail, addressed to the party for whom intended, as follows: 
To Landlord: Peay Investment Corp. 
585 East 300 South 
Provo, Utah 84606 
To Tenant: Body Firm Aerobics, Inc. 
4200 North 231 East 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Either party may, from time to time, by written notice to the other, designate a different address 
which shall be substituted for the one above specified. If any notice or other document is sent 
by registered or certified and regular mail, as aforesaid, the same shall be deemed served or 
delivered when mailed. 
20. GENERAL ' 
20.1 Attorneys' Fees. In the event that any action is brought by either party 
against the other for the enforcement or declaration of any rights or remedies in or under this 
Lease, or for the breach of any covenant or condition of this Lease, then and in such event, the 
prevailing party shall be entitled to recover, and the other party shall pay all fees, costs and 
expenses including but not limited to attorney's fees, whether by suit or otherwise, and including 
any appeals and bankruptcy proceedings, 
20.2 Waiver. No waiver of any breach of any of the terms, covenants, 
agreements, restrictions or conditions of this Lease shall be construed as a waiver of any 
succeeding breach of the same or other covenants, agreements, restrictions and conditions 
thereof. 
20.3 Surrender at the End of Term. Upon expiration of the Term, or any 
extended Term thereof, or sooner termination of this Lease, Tenant shall surrender the Premises 
to Landlord. 
20.4 Lease Binding on Successors and Assigns. Subject to the limitations on 
assignment and subleasing by Tenant, each of the terms, covenants and conditions of diis Lease 
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including without limitation the following: (i) All unpaid rent which had been earned at the 
time of such termination (together with interest thereon at the rate of eighteen percent (18%) per 
annum to the time of award) plus (ii) the amount by which the unpaid rent which would have 
been earned after termination until the time of award (together with interest thereon at the rate 
of eighteen percent (18%) per annum to the time of award) exceeds the amount of such rental 
loss that is proved could have been reasonably avoided; plus (iii) the worth at die time of award 
of the amount by which the unpaid rent for the balance of the Term after the time of award 
exceeds the amount of such rental loss that is proved could be reasonably avoided; plus (iv) any 
other amount necessary to compensate the Landlord for all detriment proximately caused by the 
Tenant's failure to perform its obligations under this Lease or which in the ordinary course of 
tilings would be likely to result therefrom; plus (vj at the Landlord's election, such other 
amounts in addition to ur in iieu oi the foregoing as may be permitted from time to time by 
applicable law. Upon any such re-entry, the Landlord shall have the nght at the Tenant's 
expense to make any repairs, alterations or modifications to the Premises, which the Landlord 
in its discretion deems reasonable and necessary. As used in this Section, die "worth at the time 
of award" is computed by discounting such amount at the discount rate of the U.S. Federal 
Reserve Bank at the time of award plus one percent (1 %). As used in this Section, "rent" shall 
mean the rent to be paid pursuant to Section 4 above and ail other monetary sums required to 
be paid by the Tenant pursuant to the terms of this Lease. 
18.3 Additional and Cumulative Remedies. In addition to the nonexclusive 
remedies provided in Section 18.2 above, the Landlord shall have ail remedies now or hereafter 
provided by law for enforcing the provisions of this Lease and the Landlord's rights hereunder. 
Nothing m the preceding sections hereof affects the right of Landlord to equitable relief where 
such relief is appropriate. 
18.4 Lien. Tenant agrees that the rent and charges above reserved shall be a first 
shall extend to and be binding on and inure to the benefit of not only Landlord and Tenant, but 
each of their respective successors and assigns. Whenever in this Lease, reference is made to 
either Landlord or tenant, the reference shall be deemed to include wherever applicable, their 
successors and assigns the same as if in every case expressed. 
20.5 Inspection. Landlord reserves the right to enter the Premises at any 
reasonable time for the purpose of inspecting the Premises, collecting the rent and doing any 
other act or thing reasonably necessary or proper for the preservation or care of the Premises. 
20.6 Time of the Essence. Time is the essence of this Lease. 
20.7 Headings, The headings or titles to tiie sections of this Lease are not a part 
of this Lease and shall have no affect upon the constniction or interpretation of any part of this 
Lease. 
20.8 Entire Agreement. This Lease and any Addendum attached hereto, initialed 
by the parties and made a part hereof, contain the entire agreement of the parties with respect 
to the matters covered hereby, and no other agreement, statement or promise made by any party, 
or to any employee, officer or agent of any party, which is not contained herein, shall be 
binding or valid. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this Lease the day and year first 
above written. 
LANDLORD 
PEAY INVESTMENT COR 
TENANT: 
BODY FIRM AEROBICS, INC. 
SrotpFelstea, Vice President /Eynette Felsteof President 
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Scott T.Evans, USB #6218 
Heather L.Thuel, USB #10106 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Telephone: (801)323.5000 
Facsimile : (801)323.9037 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DIVISION, STATE OF UTAH 
NELDA P. JOHNSON, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
GOLD'S GYM and PEAY INVESTMENT 
COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Case No.: 0504001206 PI 
Judge: Fred D. Howard 
The Court is hereby notified that DEFENDANTS GOLD GYM'S RESPONSE TO 
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES AND REQUEST FOR 
PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS was submitted by Defendants through their attorneys of 
record, in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure on this \ 3 day of January, 2007 
by mailing the same, postage prepaid, to the following: 
S. Austin Johnson 
JOHNSON LAW ASSOC. 
345-B East University Pkwy 
PO Box 970880 ^ _ ^ 
Orem, UT 84097-0880 A ^ J Q / ^ / / X 
Scott T Evans 
Heather L Thuet 
Attorney for Defendants 
EXHIBTT E 
Scott T.Evans, USB #6218 
Heather L. Thuet, USB #10106 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Telephone: (801) 323.5000 
Facsimile : (801)323.9037 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DIVISION, STATE OF UTAH 
NELDA P. JOHNSON, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
GOLD'S GYM and PEAY INVESTMENT 
COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
DEFEND AN I COLD GYM S 
SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO 
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF 
INTERROGATORIES AND REQUEST 
FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMFNTS 
Case No.: 0504001206 PI 
Judge: Fred D. Howard 
Defendant, Gold's Gym, hereby supplements its response to plaintiffs first set of 
interrogatories and requests for production of documents as follows: 
INTERROGATORY NO. 9: Describe any reports of accidents, tripping of 
persons, or slip and falls that have occurred in the parking lot at Gold's Gym in Provo. 
RESPONSE: Gold's Gym objects to this as it is not teasonabl) limited m 
scope, subject matter, location or time. Moreover, Interrogatory No. 9 is not likely 
to lead to the discovery of admissibli t \ nl« in # Sttb|t t l fit iinl v iftmnf w ,«n m«» (Ins 
objection Gold's Gym responds as follows: in addition to the incidents previously 
t f |HIi li fl, on J< mi in 1 ' '(HI in itiflu iiiniil 1i I) on black ice outsirii the front door 
reported, on January 13, 2007, an individual fell on black ice outside the front door 
of Gold's Gym. 
DATED t h i s X ^ d a y of February, 2007 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P C 
fott T Evans 
Heather L Thuet 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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Scott T.Evans, USB #6218 
Heather L. Thuet, USB #10106 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Telephone: (801) 323.5000 
Facsimile : (801)323.9037 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DIVISION, STATE OF UTAH 
NELDA P. JOHNSON, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
GOLD'S GYM and PEAY INVESTMENT 
COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Case No.: 0504001206 PI 
Judge: Fred D. Howard 
The Court is hereby notified that DEFENDANTS' SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSES TO 
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES AND REQUESTS FOR 
PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS was submitted by Defendants through their attorneys of 
record, in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure on this £2?*^day of February, 2007 
by mailing the same, postage prepaid, to the following: 
S. Austin Johnson 
Johnson Law Firm, P.C. 
345 B. East University Parkway 
Orem, Utah 84058 
-laf-?ott T. Evtffis 
Heather L. Thuet 
Attorney for Defendants 
EXHIBIT F 
CERTIF IED C O P Y 
N TFF F O J " - I J U P I C ^ . I ^~ :>TRTC~ ^ U R T ^ J - N P F J P 
U T A H C 2 J N T Y , ST M E OF U Arl 
NFL" A P . Ju fTJS^K, 
P l a i n t i f f , 
V O I D ' S GYM a n d PEAY I W ^ 3TI1FKT 
COMPANY, 
D c i o r i c i d r t ^ . 
n o . n : c . 0 0 1 2 0 G P : 
* * A A - * * * X * * * A * - A - * * - * - * - A * * A >r A" A" > -x T- A <k A A k k + r~r~k*-kk-k 
D E P O S T T T J l . O F : 
LYNN T R E G E A G L E 
A- * kk-kk-A-x-xk k-kk*k + -A-k-x-kkk V •* •>» V i x T i t * x •! ^ k k •* ~n k k k -e 
JAIL: MAY 1 1 , 2 0 0 / 
P L A C i : OUINLA 1N1I 
C O T J ^ R F N L F prr,jvi 
CREM, OLAH 
REPOPTEO ?Y ALISCi: SELFRIDGE, OPR, C*I, FDR 
3 3 3 S O U T H R I O GRANDE 
S A L T LAKE CITY UTAH 84101 
w w w DEPOMAXMERIT COM 
DEPOMAXMERIT 
i LITIGATION SERVICES 
TOLL FREE 8 0 0 337 6 6 2 9 
P H O N E 801 328 11P^ 
FAX 801 3°^ 
• A TRADITION O F QUALITY • 
Q By Mr. Johnson - LYNN TREGEAGLE 2 5 
v hat. 7 ' m t r y i n g . c n o 1 p y o u a n c o r s L a n d . 
M \ . J 0 i IN S C; N : S o a r c y o u u n v; i _ i n o t o s a y 
what you o o n s ; d c r a t r : p n a r a r o a s a p r o p e r t y o w n e r ? 
A. 1 w i l l b c y t n a o r y e x p e r i e n c e t e 11 b r e 
t h a t a M i p h a z a r d - - r :on^bcc iv c o u l o t n p o f f c : t h c i t 
s m o o t : : C d r p e t e c l f l o o r . T r i a l ' s a s f a r c\s I -- my 
e x p e r i e n c e t e l l e 'fie Lhci l , b e c a u s e T f v e c io re i t m y s e l f . 
0 . S o w h a t e 1 e \/ a t j o n w o u i d y o u s L r i ve t o 
e l i n m o a u e Lo make a f l o o r f r e e f rom t r i p h a z a r d s ? 
MR . JFKKS: O b j e c t i o n . . . 
A . I l l e r e i s n ' t . h v e r y " n o i v 1 d u a . i s c a p a o 1 e 
of t r i p p m q o v - r a smoo t r i f l o o r . 
0 . So when you i n s t a l l o a r p e e , d^d you e v e r 
c o n s i d e r t r y i n g 00 n a k e i t f r e e f r o m t r i p h a z a r d s ? 
A. No, I d i d n ' t . 
Q. Would vou loave a half- inch lodge anywhere 
and consider t h a. that's n o1 a u r \p h a z a r d ? 
A. 1 wouicin't leave a ha:f-inch .cogc- in a 
o a r p e t ] o b t o s fart w i t h . 
Q. Whv? 
1 
A. I'd have LO go back ana fix it and make 
sure io wasn't. 
Q. Wr.y? 
A. Because the customer wouldn't allow it. 
It's unsightly. WheLhey it was a t u p hazaro or not, 
Alison Selfridge, CSR, CRI, RDR 
DepomaxMerit Litigation Services 
(801 )328-1188*1 -800-337-6629 \ 
EXHIBIT G 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, JUL 2 2007 
UTAH COUNTY, SI 
NELDA P. JOHNSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GOLD'S GYM and PEAY INVESTMENT 
COMPANY, 1 
Defendants. 
ATE OF UTAH *Bi&g&> 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Date: July 2, 2007 
Case No. 070102050 
Division XI: Judge David N. Mortensen 
This matter comes before the court on the following motions: 
1. The Defendant's motion for summary judgment filed on April 6, 2007. 
2. Defendant's motion filed on April 27, 2007, to strike Plaintiffs designation of 
expert witnesses. 
3. Defendant's motion to compel discovery filed on April 30, 2007. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
On April 13, 2005, Nelda P. Johnson ("Plaintiff) filed a complaint against Gold's Gym 
and Peay Investment Company ("Defendants"), which the Defendants then filed answers to. In 
her complaint, the Plaintiff alleged that she fell in the parking lot at Gold's Gym and injured her 
knee. 
The parties filed an attorney's Rule 26(f) planning meeting report and stipulated 
scheduling order wherein the parties agreed that the deadline for conducting fact discovery would 
be November 15, 2006. The deadline for identification of the Plaintiffs expert witnesses and 
production of their expert witness reports would be December 15, 2006, which is 30 days from i 
the completion of fact discovery. The deadline for identification of Defendant's rebuttal expert 
witnesses and production of reports was set at January 15, 2007, which is 60 days after the 
Plaintiffs disclosure of expert witnesses and production of expert reports. In the first week of 
December 2006, the Defendants agreed to the Plaintiffs request to extend fact discovery until 
January 30, 2007. On March 2, 2007, Plaintiff filed her designation of expert witnesses, but then 
negotiated another extension of time for providing her expert's reports. 
Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on April 6, 2007. On April 24, 2007, 
Plaintiff filed a motion for extension of time to respond to Defendants' summary judgment 
motion.1 Defendants also filed a motion to strike the Plaintiffs designation of expert witnesses, 
a motion to compel discovery, and a memorandum in opposition to the Plaintiffs motion for 
extension of time. Plaintiff filed no other response to Defendants' motion for summary judgment. 
Plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition to defendant's motion to strike the expert 
designation. 
DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS 
1. Defendants' Request for Summary Judgment 
Summary judgment "shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law." U.R.C.P. 56(c). Additionally, 'the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom [are viewed] in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party . . . ." Jackson v. 
1
 No request to submit for decision has been filed regarding Plaintiffs motion for a 45 day extension of 
time. Plaintiff also has filed a motion to compel to which defendant has responded. No request to submit 
for decision has been filed regarding this motion either. 
Mateus, 70 P. 3d 78, 80 (Utah 2003) (internal citations omitted). Summary Judgment "denies the 
opportunity of trial [and so] should be granted only when it clearly appears that there is no 
reasonable probability the party moved against could prevail. Utah State University of 
Agriculture and Applied Sciences v. Sutro & Co., 646 P.2d 715, 720 (Utah 1982). 
As opposed to addressing the merits of the motion, plaintiff has sought only an extension 
of time. Giving the plaintiff every benefit of the doubt, particularly believing that plaintiffs 
counsel did not receive the motion and memorandum until two days before the memorandum in 
opposition was due, this Court grants an extension but not that sought by the plaintiff. Plaintiff 
sought an extension of 45 days, although her own memorandum indicated that the pertinent 
affidavits could be obtained in a matter of days, not weeks. Further, by now a period of 45 days 
has expired. 
Like the defendant, this Court is construing defendant's motion for extension of time as a 
rule 56 (f) affidavit. There is no explanation within plaintiffs motion for extension of time as to 
why discovery could not have been obtained earlier. Nor is there any real explanation as to why 
the affidavits could not be obtained in a faster manner. The motion for extension of time is 
completely silent as to any specific allegation of evidence sought to be discovered. The court 
further notes that extensions of time for discovery have previously been granted. 
Accordingly, plaintiffs motion for extension is hereby granted only for the purposes of 
responding to the merits of the motion and obtaining the two affidavits identified. This Court 
considers discovery closed, unless stipulated to by the parties. Plaintiff shall have until July 9, 
2007 to file any and all responses to the motion for summary judgment. 
2. Defendants' Request to Strike Plaintiffs Designation of Expert Witnesses 
Defendants' motion to strike plaintiffs designation of expert witnesses is granted in part 
and denied in part. As to any treating physician for whom records have previously been received 
by defendants, such records may be considered reports for the purposes of rule 26.2 However, at 
trial where no further report has been produced, the witness will be limited to those subjects 
identified and supported in the medical records. Again, giving the plaintiff every benefit of the 
doubt, any complete expert disclosures made prior to February 28th, 2007, 30 days after the end of 
I 
fact discovery shall be considered timely. It appears from the record that defendants gave an 
extension to plaintiff to supply expert reports until March 18, 2007. While plaintiff did not meet 
this exact date, it appears that the information concerning Dr. Wyman, including a full report and 
previous testimony disclosures, has been made. As a result, defendant's motion as to Dr. Wyman 
is hereby denied. 
Plaintiff concedes that "Clay" and Leslie Thorton shall not be called as experts. 
Accordingly, defendants motion as to "Clay" and Leslie Thorton is hereby granted. 
Plaintiff asserts that plaintiffs expert designation filed March 2, 2007 complies with rule 
26. Rule 26 (a)(3)(B) provides: 
Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, this disclosure shall, 
with respect to a witness who is retained were specially employed to provide expert 
testimony in the case were whose duties as an employee of the party regularly involve 
giving expert testimony, be accompanied by a written report prepared and signed by the 
witness or party. 
As plaintiff points out, this report may be signed by the witness or the party (or the party's 
attorney on behalf of the party). However, it appears plaintiff has failed to consider the 
I 
This seems to comport with rule 26(a)(3)(B)'s language requiring reports of a witness who "is retained or specially 
employed to provide expert testimony in the case. . . ." since often treating physicians are employed firstly as a 
healer and only secondarily as a witness, the reporting requirement of this rule arguably does not apply. However, 
once a party seeks to introduce testimony which aids litigation but was not needed for the purposes of treatment, it 
would appear that the party has placed that witness within the purview of the rule. 
remainder of the rule which provides: 
The report shall contain the subject matter on which the expert is expected to testify; the 
substance of the facts and opinions to which the expert is expected to testify; a summary 
of the grounds for each opinion; the qualifications of the witness, including a list of all 
publications authored by the witness within the preceding 10 years; the compensation to 
be paid for the study and testimony; and a listing of any other cases in which the 
witnesses testified as an expert at trial or by deposition within the preceding four years. 
The disclosures of the plaintiff barely contain the subject matter on which the experts are to 
testify, with the exception of Dr. Wyman. As to all of the other experts, no summary of the 
grounds is given for each opinion. The substance of the facts and opinions to which the expert is 
expected to testify are absent as well. This Court could perceive no facts stated in plaintiffs 
disclosure. The qualifications of the witnesses is wholly absent. No indication is made as to any 
publications, if they exist, authored by any witness. The compensation to be paid to the witness, 
easily ascertainable, is absent. With the exception of Dr. Wyman, no list has been given of any 
other cases in which the witnesses testified at trial or deposition within the preceding four years. 
In sum, the disclosures are deficient and would not allow a party to assess the need to conduct 
discovery connected with the expert testimony, and assuredly would not assist any party in 
preparing for trial. Ultimately, the purposes of rule 26 have been circumvented. Both as to 
initial disclosures, other disclosures, and expert disclosures, the purpose of the rules was to 
encourage the free flow of information, not a hide matters until trial. David Jenkins is hereby 
stricken as an expert for the plaintiff 
Accordingly, defendant's motion is granted in part and denied in part consistent with the 
above. 
3, Defendants' Motion to Compel Discovery 
Defendants' motion to compel discovery remains unopposed by plaintiff. Further, the 
motion provides a sufficient basis for relief. Accordingly, defendants motion to compel is hereby 
granted, along with attorney's fees and costs for bringing the motion as requested. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the above facts and analysis, the ruling of the court is as follows: 
1. Defendant's motion for summary judgment is denied, until such time as plaintiff responds, or 
July 9, 2007, whichever is earlier. Thereupon, defendant may submit issue for decision again. 
2. Defendant's motion to strike Plaintiffs designation of expert witnesses is granted in part and 
denied in part. 
3. Defendant's motion to compel is granted. 
Counsel for Defendants is instructed to prepare an appropriate order consistent with this 
ruling and submit it to the court consistent with Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Dated this 1/ day of July, 
A certificate of mailing is on the following page. 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 070102050 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail S AUSTIN JOHNSON 
Attorney PLA 
345-B E UNIVERSITY PKWY 
OREM, UT 84058 
Mail HEATHER L THUET 
Attorney DEF 
15 WEST SOUTH TEMPLE STE 8 00 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84101-
Dated this
 ryl day of 
ourt C 
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EXHIBIT H 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
NELDA P. JOHNSON, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 




Date: September 17, 2007 
Case No. 070102050 
Division XI: Judge David N. Mortensen 
This matter comes before the court on defendant's motion for summary judgment. The 
motion has been fully briefed by both parties. For the reasons set forth below, defendant's 
motion is granted. 
UNDISPUTED FACTS 
The following undisputed material facts are based on the plaintiffs response to facts 
alleged by defendants' in their Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Pursuant to Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, facts which were not controverted by 
the plaintiff are deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment.1 
]Under Rule 7, facts not controverted are deemed admitted. Where a fact is purportedly 
controverted, but the non-moving party either fails to properly controvert the fact under Rule 7 
(by providing ground disputing the fact with particularity and supporting the dispute by citation 
to relevant materials) or fails to controvert the fact in a "genuine" way, a trial court may likewise 
considei the asserted fact admitted. 
In this case, the court could deem all of defendant's facts admitted by plaintiffs 
wholesale failure to follow Rule 7(c)(3)(B). "A memorandum opposing a motion for summary 
judgment shall contain a verbatim restatement of each of the moving party's facts that is 
Page 1 of 11 'i\Ts ~ 
I,., d .-, 
1. On July 7, 2004, plaintiff joined Gold's Gym. 
2. As a condition of membership, plaintiff was required to sign a contract ("Contract") 
that included the Assumption of Risk and Risk of Accident clause ("Release"). 
3. Plaintiff read, signed, and agreed to be bound by the terms and conditions of the 
Release. 
4. The Release executed by the plaintiff includes the following language: 
...ANY PERSON USING THE EQUIPMENT OR THE FACILITIES DOES SO AT 
THEIR OWN RISK...and the Gym shall not be liable to Buyer or Member for any claims, 
demands, injuries, damages, or actions arising due to injury to Buyer or Member, their 
person, or property arising out of or in connection with the use by Buyer or Member of 
the services and facilities or the premises where the same is located and Buyer or Member 
hereby holds the Gym, its employees and agents harmless from all claims which may be 
brought against them by Buyer or Member or on either of their behalf for such injuries of 
claims aforesaid. 
5. On July 12, 2004, plaintiff tripped and fell in the parking lot at Gold's Gym at about 
9:30 p.m. and injured her knee. 
6. Plaintiffs son S. Andrew Johnson, daughter Jocelyn Vance, and son-in-law Justin 
Vance were present in the Gold's Gym parking lot when plaintiff fell. 
7. Prior to being informed by plaintiff of her injury and the defect in the parking lot that 
caused it, defendants had never observed or been made aware of any dangerous condition, either 
cracks or holes, existing within the asphalt parking lot. 
8. Prior to plaintiffs fall, there had been no reports of any accidents or falls in the 
controverted[.]" Further, additional facts to be considered must be separately stated and 
numbered and supported by citation to relevant materials. The court specifically holds that as to 
the facts hereinafter stated, plaintiff has failed to raise a genuine issue. 
Page 2 of 11 
parking lot caused by cracks, holes, or broken asphalt at a time when there were more than 1,000 
visitors per day at Gold's Gym. 
9. During her visit to the gym only the day before her fall, plaintiff did not observe any 
problems with the asphalt or trip hazards. 
10. Plaintiff did not see the crack in the asphalt before she fell. 
11. Plaintiff has not provided any evidence that defendants had notice of any dangerous 
condition existing in the parking lot prior to plaintiffs fall. 
DISPUTED FACTS THAT ARE NOT MATERIAL 
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure sets forth the standard for summary 
judgment and states that summary judgment "shall be rendered if...there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." In 
determining whether summary judgment is proper, the court views the facts in a light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party. 
ANALYSIS 
Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted because (1) plaintiff released 
defendant Gold's Gym from liability when she signed the Contract upon becoming a member of 
the gym, and (2) plaintiff failed to show that defendants had actual or constructive notice of the 
defect in the asphalt that caused her to fall. The court discusses each of these reasons in turn. 
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I. PLAINTIFF RELEASED DEFENDANT GOLD'S GYM FROM LIABILITY 
WHEN SHE SIGNED THE RELEASE INCLUDED IN THE CONTRACT UPON 
BECOMING A MEMBER OF THE GYM. 
Although Utah case law strictly construes contract clauses that attempt to limit one's 
liability, courts will enforce such terms if "the preclusion against negligence is clearly and 
unequivocally stated." Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. First Security Corp., 341 P.2d 944 (Utah 
1959). While the release of liability must be clearly and unequivocally stated, the rule of strict 
construction does not require a specific reference to one party's negligence. See Freund v. Utah 
Power & Light Co., 793 P.2d 362, 371 (Utah 1990) (holding that an agreement that did not 
specifically mention the effect of one party's negligence was nevertheless effective to release the 
party from potential negligence because of the "broad sweep of the language."). Indeed, the Utah 
Court of Appeals noted almost twenty years ago that "the contemporary judicial trend is to limit 
the application of the strict construction rule[]" and that "the law of Utah should develop 
consistent with this trend." Pickhover v. Smith's Management Corp., Ill P.2d 664, 667 (Utah 
Ct.App. 1989). 
A. The Release in the Contract expresses a clear and unequivocal intent 
by the parties that the plaintiff would release Gold's Gym from any 
liability arising from the use of the equipment, the facilities, or the 
premises of the gym. 
As noted above, if a clause purporting to release one party from liability is clear and 
unequivocal in its terms, a court will enforce the clause. In Russ v Woodside Homes, 905 P.2d 
901, 906 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), the Utah Court of Appeals interpreted this requirement in the 
context of a release clause in which the plaintiff agreed to hold defendant "harmless for 'any and 
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all claims, damages, loss and expenses'" and "for 'any death, accident, injury, or other 
occurrence resulting from visits to [defendant's] job site.'" The court cited to Freund for the 
principle that although the provision did not explicitly mention negligence of the defendant, "the 
word 'negligence' is not a talisman to enforce contracts avoiding potential liability." Id. at 905 
(citing Freund, 793 P.2d at 370). The court stated, "A hold harmless provision is enforceable 
when 'the broad sweep of the language employed by the parties clearly covers those instances in 
which a party may be negligent.'" Id. (citing Freund, 793 P.2d at 371). The court found that the 
provision clearly expressed the parties' intent to avoid the defendant's potential liability for 
negligence and that it therefore was enforceable and barred the plaintiffs negligence claim 
against the defendant. Id. at 906. 
The language from the Contract signed by plaintiff is very similar to the provision at issue 
in the Woodside Homes case. It states that "the Gym shall not be liable to Buyer or Member for 
any claims, demands, injuries, damages, or actions arising due to injury to Buyer or Member...." 
Although this does not explicitly mention negligence on the part of Gold's Gym, the language is 
clearly broad enough to include those instances in which Gold's Gym may be negligent. The 
language clearly and unequivocally expresses an intent by the parties that plaintiff will hold 
defendant Gold's Gym harmless "from all claims[,]" including claims alleging negligence on the 
part of defendant Gold's Gym. 
B. The plaintiffs injury, which was allegedly caused by a defect in the 
asphalt in the Gold's Gym parking lot, is covered by the terms of the 
Release. 
It is a well-accepted tenet of contract law that "[i]f the language within the four corners 
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of the contract is unambiguous, the parties['] intentions are determined from the plain meaning 
of the contractual language, and the contract may be interpreted as a matter of law." Central 
Florida Investments, Inc. v. Parkwest Assocs., 2002 UT 3, Tfl2, 40 P.3d 599 (citations omitted). 
The Utah Supreme Court has explained that "[a]n ambiguity exists where the language 'is 
reasonably capable of being understood in more than one sense.'" Dixon v. Pro Image, Inc., 1999 
UT 89,1J13, 987 P.2d 48 (citation omitted). This court holds as a matter of law that the terms of 
the Release are unambiguous, and that the term "premises" includes the parking lot in which the 
plaintiff was injured. 
One definition of "premises" in Webster }s Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary is "a 
building together with its grounds or other appurtenances." This is the plain meaning of the word 
"premises" in everyday usage. Additionally, when taken in context, the use of the word 
"premises" in the phrase "the use...of the services and facilities or the premises where the same is 
located[,]" is not reasonably capable of being understood in more than one sense or in a different 
sense from the definition given above. Contrary to plaintiffs argument, the parking lot is clearly 
covered by the terms of the release, and her claim based on her injury in the parking lot is within 
the ambit of the release. Therefore, plaintiffs negligence claim is barred as to defendant Gold's 
Gym. 
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II. THE DEFECT COMPLAINED OF BY PLAINTIFF WAS TEMPORARY IN 
NATURE, SO HER FAILURE TO SHOW THAT DEFENDANTS HAD PRIOR 
NOTICE OF THE UNSAFE CONDITION IS FATAL TO HER CASE. 
The court holds that the defect complained of by the plaintiff was temporary in nature, so 
a failure to establish actual or constructive notice to the defendants and sufficient time to remedy 
the condition is therefore fatal to her case. 
In premises liability cases, Utah case law creates two classes of unsafe conditions: those 
that are temporary, and those that are of a permanent nature. Goebel v. Salt Lake City S. R.R. 
Co., 2004 UT 80, ^jl9, 104 P.3d 1185. Where unsafe conditions are temporary, a business owner 
must have actual or constructive knowledge of the conditions and sufficient time after receiving 
such knowledge to remedy the situation. Id In contrast, where the unsafe condition is 
permanent-which is defined as a condition which was chosen or created by the business owner or 
for which he is responsible-the business owner is deemed to have knowledge of the condition. 
Id Plaintiff maintains that this case falls into the second category where an unsafe condition is 
permanent and therefore notice of the condition is assumed. Plaintiff's memorandum in 
opposition at 11. This court disagrees. 
A. The defect in the asphalt was temporary. 
The Utah Supreme Court first articulated the difference between temporary and 
permanent unsafe conditions in premises liability cases in Allen v Federated Dairy Farms, 538 
P.2d 175 (Utah 1975) The court stated that the first class of cases "involves some unsafe 
condition of a temporary nature, such as a slippery substance on the floor and usually where it is 
not known how it got there." Id at 176 (emphasis included). In contrast, the second class of 
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cases described by the court "involves some unsafe condition of a permanent nature, such as: in 
the structure of a building, or of a stairway, etc. or in equipment or machinery, or its manner of 
use, which was created or chosen by the defendants (or his agents), or for which he is 
responsible." Id. (emphasis included). 
In Goebel, the plaintiffs injury was allegedly caused by a gap between rubber mats that 
adjoined the road to a railroad crossing. 2004 UT 80, at \ 6. The plaintiffs argued that the gap 
was a permanent unsafe condition of which the defendant railway company was deemed to have 
knowledge. Id. at %\9. However, the Utah Supreme Court held that the gap was not a permanent 
unsafe condition because "the defendant did not create the unsafe condition, and [was] 
'responsible' for it only in the context of maintenance, not for its existence in the first place." Id. 
at ^20. The court found that because "the proximate cause of Mr. Goebel's injury was the 
breakdown or mechanical degradation of something that was not alleged to have been negligently 
created or installed[,]" the gap was therefore a temporary unsafe condition of which the 
defendant must have had notice in order to be held liable. Id. at ^[21. 
Although plaintiff argues that the defect in the asphalt was permanent and therefore 
required no notice, the court finds that the defect was temporary in nature. It is clear that the 
alleged defect was not chosen or created by the defendants, and plaintiff does not argue that the 
parking lot was "negligently created or installed." Nor were the defendants responsible for the 
crack or hole in the asphalt beyond a responsibility "in the context of maintenance, not for its 
existence in the first place." Similar to the Goebel case, the defect that was alleged to have 
caused plaintiffs injuries was created by the "breakdown or mechanical degradation" of the 
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asphalt. This court therefore holds that the defect in the asphalt was an unsafe condition that was 
temporary in nature.2 
B. There is no evidence that defendants had actual or constructive notice 
of the defect. 
When an unsafe condition is temporary in nature, courts require "evidence that the 
defendant had some kind of notice of the dangerous condition, together with evidence that the 
defendant had that notice for a time sufficient for it to repair that condition." Id. at %L\. In fact, 
the Utah Supreme Court stated that "evidence of notice and a reasonable time to remedy are 
required to survive a motion for summary judgment or directed verdict." Id. at |^22 (emphasis 
added). In explaining the rationale for different notice requirements based on the nature of the 
unsafe condition, the court stated, "[I]t is reasonable to presume that a party has notice of 
conditions that the party itself creates, but it is not reasonable to presume notice of conditions 
that someone else creates..., that arise from malfunctions..., or that gradually evolve on their 
own." Id. 
In Goebel, the plaintiffs had no evidence that the defendant had actual notice, so they 
argued that the defendant had constructive notice based on its failure to perform reasonable 
inspections. Id at Tf23. However, the court rejected this argument because the plaintiff and the 
plaintiffs' expert both failed to notice the gap themselves. Id In addition, the plaintiffs argued 
that the gap must have evolved gradually over time, so the defendant would have noticed the gap 
2This conclusion is butressed by plaintiffs opposition which notes, with attached 
photographs, the "repair" of the condition after the event. 
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if it had been paying attention and therefore would have had a reasonable time to repair it. Id. at 
1J24. The court likewise rejected this argument because the plaintiffs had introduced no evidence 
that the gap had evolved gradually as opposed to being formed suddenly. Id. at P25. The court 
also stated that even if the gap had existed for a long period of time, there was no reason to 
believe that the defendant should have noticed it since there was no evidence that the defendant 
did not reasonably inspect the railroad crossing. Id. The court found that because the plaintiffs 
had offered no evidence that the defendant knew of the gap or the length of time for which the 
defendant had such notice, their "mere hypothesis that the gap may have existed for some 
unknown length of time does not suffice." Id. 
The court's analysis in Goebel is controlling in this case. 
If a plaintiff alleges that the defendant negligently failed to remedy a dangerous condition that the 
defendant did not create (as in Schnuphase), negligently failed to repair a dangerous malfunction 
in an otherwise safe system (as in Fishbaugh), or negligently allowed an otherwise safe condition 
to degrade over time into a dangerous condition (as in the instant case), then evidence of notice 
and a reasonable time to remedy are required to survive a motion for summary judgment[.] 
Goebel, 2004 UT 80, \ 22, 104 P.3d 1185. As in Goebel, the plaintiff has produced no evidence 
that defendants had actual notice of the defect in the asphalt. And while plaintiff has implied that 
defendants did not conduct reasonable inspections of the parking lot, plaintiff has produced no 
evidence to that effect. Plaintiff has also failed to produce evidence of the length of time the 
defect in the asphalt existed. Because plaintiff has failed to introduce evidence that defendants 
did not reasonably inspect the parking lot, that defendants knew of the defect, or the length of 
time for which the defendants had notice, the plaintiff cannot recover on her claim as a matter of 
law. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the above facts and analysis, defendant's motion for summary judgment is 
hereby granted. Counsel for defendants is instructed to prepare appropriate order consistent with 
this ruling and adopting this memorandum decision by reference. 
Dated this J[|_%ay of September, 2007. 
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EXHIBIT I 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
NELDA P. JOHNSON, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
GOLD'S GYM and PEAY INVESTMENT 
COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
RULING ON MOTIONS TO 
RECONSIDER, STRIKE, AND COMPEL 
Date: November 29, 2007 
Case No. 070102050 
Division XI: Judge David N. Mortensen 
This matter comes before the court on plaintiffs motion to reconsider, plaintiffs motion 
to compel, and defendant's motion to strike photographs. For the reasons which follow 
plaintiffs motions to reconsider and compel are denied and defendant's motion to strike 
photographs is granted. 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
This action was commenced when plaintiff filed a complaint on April 13, 2005. The 
parties entered into a stipulated scheduling order whereby fact discovery would end November 
15, 2006 and expert discovery would follow. The parties agreed to an extension of fact discovery 
until January 30, 2007. After all of the dates had expired, the defendants filed a motion for 
summary judgment on April 6, 2007. In response to the motion for summary judgment, plaintiff 
did not file any substantive response, but instead filed a motion for extension of time to respond 
to defendants' motion. No affidavit was submitted pursuant to rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. In fact, plaintiff never submitted for decision her motion for a 45 day extension 
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of time to respond to the motion for summary judgment. In addition to failing to submit her 
motion, no response to the motion for summary judgment was filed within the 45 days initially 
requested. Nevertheless, giving plaintiffs counsel every benefit, this court construed the motion 
for extension of time as a rule 56(f) affidavit. This court allowed plaintiff to file a response even 
though the motion for extension of time gave no explanation as to why discovery could not have 
been obtained earlier, nor did it contain any explanation as to why opposing affidavits could not 
be obtained in a more expeditious manner, and the motion was completely silent as to any 
specific allegation of evidence sought to be discovered. 
Plaintiff did file a response to motion for summary judgment on July 2, 2007. Plaintiff 
did not request oral argument on the motion for summary judgment. On September 17, 2007 this 
court issued a memorandum decision granting defendants summary judgment. An order 
reflecting the memorandum decision was executed by this judge on October 17, 2007. 
Apparently that same day plaintiffs counsel faxed a letter to the court asking the court to rule on 
the motion to reconsider before executing the order. However, the order had already been 
executed. 
On October 10, 2007, plaintiff filed a "motion for reconsideration of order granting 
summary judgment," along with a memorandum in support of this motion. The motion does not 
assert that it is being brought pursuant to any rule under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The 
motion maintains that this court should reconsider its decision regarding summary judgment 
arguing that: (1) this court wrongly concluded that plaintiff had released defendant Gold's gym 
when she signed the membership agreement, (2) plaintiffs claimed did not arise from a temporary 
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condition and therefore notice of the condition was not required, (3) that the issue of constructive 
notice is a fact issue for the jury, and finally (4) that this court is the improper venue for this 
cause of action. 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IS PROCEDURALLY DEFECTIVE 
Plaintiff has brought a motion to reconsider, a motion not enumerated by the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. This court concludes that when a trial court issues a decision which disposes 
of all claims in a matter a party is precluded from revisiting the case by way of a "motion to 
reconsider." Accordingly, plaintiffs motion is denied. 
For many years the appellate courts have been discouraging motions to reconsider. The 
Utah Supreme Court in Shipman v. Evans, 2004 UT 44 1]18 n. 5 stated: 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure do not recognize motions to reconsider. 
Although we have discouraged these motions, see Watkiss & Campbell v Foa & 
Son, 808 P.2d 1061, 1063-65 (Utah 1991), they have proliferated in civil actions 
to the extent that they have become the cheatgrass of the litigation landscape. We 
acknowledge that the extraordinary circumstance may arise when it is appropriate 
to request a trial court to reconsider a ruling. These occasions are rare, however, 
and we encourage attorneys to reverse the trend to make such motions to 
reconsider routine. 
Having ascertained that repeated suggestions had fallen on generally deaf ears, the court in Gillett 
v. Price, 2006 UT 24 cut down a wide swath of the motion to reconsider cheatgrass by holding 
that "regardless of the motion's substance, post-judgment motions to reconsider and other 
similarly titled motions will not toll the time for appeal because they are not recognized by our 
rules." The court noted, however, that uthis holding applies to post-final -judgment motions to 
reconsider; it does not affect motions to or decisions by the district courts to reconsider or revise 
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nonfinal judgments, which have no impact on the time to appeal and are sanctioned by our 
rules." The issue in Gillett was whether the Utah Court of Appeals had properly held that 
plaintiffs notice of appeal was not timely. Thus the holding of the Supreme Court of Utah in 
Gillett addressed a motion to reconsider and its ability to toll the time for appeal. Accordingly, 
the holding of the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Gillett does not truly address motions to 
reconsider brought before a final judgment is entered. That is the circumstance here. 
The remaining cheatgrass, but for a few select stalks, should be hewn down. This court 
does not believe that all motions to reconsider are in fact sanctioned by the rules when placed 
before the trial court pre-fmal-judgment. In noting the fact that the rules sanction, arguably, a 
motion to reconsider, the Utah Supreme Court in Gillett referenced rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. However, a close reading of the rule shows the sanction of motions to 
reconsider, otherwise known as revision of prior decisions, to be limited. 
Rule 54(b) provides: 
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, 
counterclaim, cross claim, or third-party claim, and/or when multiple parties are 
involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but 
fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination by the 
court that there is no just reason for delay and upon express direction for the entry 
of judgment. In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or 
other form of decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the 
claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate 
the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of 
decision is subject to revision at any time before entry of judgment adjudicating 
all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties. 
(emphasis added). Thus, the rule contemplates that other forms of decision, such as a 
memorandum decision, are subject to revision only when remaining claims or rights and 
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liabilities have not been adjudicated. However, in cases such as the present one where the grant 
of summary judgment disposes of all claims, there is no good reason that motions to reconsider 
should be recognized under this rule. The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, particularly rules 52 
and 59, provide sufficient avenues of redress for the extraordinary circumstance alluded to in 
Shipman. 
For example, it may occur that, between the grant of summary judgment and the signing 
of the final order, precedent is established by an appellate court which brings into question the 
validity of a trial court's ruling. Likewise, it may occur that counsel ascertains after a ruling, but 
before a judgment is entered, that both parties failed to cite controlling and determinative 
precedent which likely should change the outcome of the decision. In either event, under rule 59 
a party could make a motion for a new trial claiming an error in law. See rule 59(a)(7); 
Crestwood Cove Apts. Bus. Trust v. Turner, 2007 UT 48, ^[40.(trial court can grant new trial 
where "prior decision was clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice").1 Also, 
should new evidence be found which could not have been, with reasonable diligence, discovered 
prior to the ruling on the motion, a motion for a new trial is a proper remedy. See rule 59(a)(4). 
Utah's appellate courts have already held that a motion for a new trial following summary 
judgment is procedurally correct and available to litigants. Interstate Land Corp. v. Patterson, 
797 P.2d 1101 (Utah App. 1990), With this remedy readily available, no reason exists to 
1
 In fact, in the past courts have construed motions to reconsider as motions for a new 
trial. Davis v. Grand County Serv. Area, 905 P.2d 888 (Utah App. 1995). 
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perpetuate motions to reconsider in cases that have been fully adjudicated on motion.2 
Further, the Gillett court's dicta concerning motions reconsider pre-fmal-judgment fails to 
address the holding in Drury v. Lunceford, 18 Utah 2d 74, 415 P.2d 662 (1966). In Drury, the 
Utah Supreme Court held that once a trial court had granted a motion for a new trial, and where 
no inadvertence, mistake, or irregularity appeared in connection with obtaining the order, the trial 
court had no authority to entertain and grant a motion to reconsider or review its own ruling.3 
The Utah Supreme Court's reasoning in Gillette provides further arguments to disallow 
pre-fmal-judgment motions to reconsider as well. First, the court restated: 
In fact, post-judgment motions to reconsider are not recognized anywhere in either the 
Utah rules of appellate procedure or the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Gillette, 2006 UT 24 [^6. In point of fact, motions to reconsider per se are not found in the rules 
at all. The court then went on to state: 
2The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provide other avenues of redress to provide a trial 
court ample opportunity to correctly address an issue. Rules 59(e) and 52(b) both allow a court 
to alter or amend a judgment, amend findings, and alter a judgment consistent with the changed 
findings. While rulings on summary judgement do not entail findings per se, a court must 
determine, or find, that no genuine issue of dispute remains. 
3
 The Drury court noted: 
If the party ruled against were permitted to go beyond the rules, make a motion for 
reconsideration, and persuade the judge to reverse himself, the question arises, why 
should not the other party who is now ruled against be permitted to make a motion for re-
reconsideration, asking the court to again reversed himself? Tenacious litigants and 
lawyers might persist in motions, arguments and pressures and theoretically a judge could 
go on reversing himself periodically at the entreaties of one or the other of the parties ad 
infinitum. 
Drury, 415 ?2d at 663. 
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We are now persuaded that it is time this practice comes to an end. In our system, the 
rules provide the source of available relief. They "[are] designed to provide a pattern or 
regularity of procedure which the parties and the courts [can] follow and rely upon." 
Id. at% citing Drury v. Lunceford, 18 Utah 2d 74, 415 P.2d 662, 663 (1966). Specifically 
recognizing the onerous burden placed upon trial courts by vaguely labeled motions, the Gillett 
court concluded: 
Hereafter, when a party seeks relief from a judgment, it must turn to the rules to 
determine whether relief exists, and if so, direct the court to the specific relief available. 
Parties can no longer leave this task to the court by filing so-called motions to reconsider 
and relying upon district courts to construe the motions within the rules. 
Id. Unless the holding of Gillett is extended to pre-final-judgment rulings which adjudicate all 
claims as well, the burden upon the trial courts will remain. As shown here, there exists no 
reason to limit this analysis to post final judgment scenarios. 
The reasons for implementing a rule disallowing motions to reconsider when a ruling has 
completely disposed of a case are highlighted by plaintiffs motion to reconsider in this case. For 
the most part plaintiff is simply re-arguing her case. To some extent plaintiff is attempting to 
supplement the record, perhaps hoping that the appellate court will not be able to make a 
distinction between the record before the trial court at the time summary judgment was granted 
and evidence or arguments presented subsequent to the memorandum decision.4 It does not 
advance the interests of justice or the efficiency of the courts to essentially allow parties to re-
argue or re-present matters to the court when significant time has already been expended in a 
memorandum decision. 
4
 An appeal in this matter has already been filed. 
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This concern is even more egregious in this case where the plaintiff party had an 
exceptionally long extension in which to respond to the motion for summary judgment. The 
entirety of the discovery period in the case had already concluded. Knowing that a grant of 
summary judgment was possible, this court would assume that all evidence within plaintiffs 
possession or control would have already been brought before the court. Additionally, even if 
information has been presented in the motion to reconsider which was not presented before the 
court made its memorandum decision in September of this year, at a minimum a party should 
have to show that somehow evidence was not reasonably attainable prior to the court's decision 
before the court should consider it in any way. Plaintiffs memorandum is silent on this issue, 
except for the allegation that certain pictures taken long after the event, and arguably irrelevant 
for determination of this case, were for ambiguous reasons unavailable.5 
For these reasons, plaintiffs motion to reconsider is hereby denied. 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER LACKS MERIT 
Even if the court were to consider the motion on the merits, the motion should be denied. 
Re-argument and assertion of new facts. Plaintiff provides nothing new in the motion 
to reconsider concerning this court's ruling that the release signed by the plaintiff relieved Gold's 
Gym of liability in this matter. Plaintiffs simply re-argues her case. The arguments were not 
5
 For example, while in opposition to a motion to strike plaintiff argues that defendants 
should have subpoenaed the photographs, plaintiff fails to recognize that this same argument 
obliterates any reasonable argument for reconsideration based upon the photographs. Could not 
plaintiff have subpoenaed the pictures herself, thus having them in her possession in a timely 
manner to oppose a summary judgment motion? 
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persuasive before, and they are not persuasive now. 
In her original opposition to the motion for summary judgment plaintiff claimed: 
Plaintiffs injury arose from the second class of a dangerous condition. 
This second class of premises liability arises where the defendant is responsible for the 
condition, he is deemed to know the condition and no proof of notice is necessary, [sic] 
Plaintiff continues to pursue this theory in the motion to reconsider; that is, that the cause of the 
fall was not a temporary condition. This court simply disagrees with plaintiffs contention, 
although the court notes that in plaintiffs motion to reconsider she attaches her own declaration, 
where in paragraph 7 she refers to the place of her fall as "broken asphalt." In other words, it 
was asphalt which originally was not broken. That which is broken and can be repaired is 
transitory, and therefore temporary. Thus, her own declaration undermines her stated position. 
Plaintiff submits a declaration of the plaintiff, which is not really a matter to be 
reconsidered, but new evidence for which the plaintiff gives no reason could not have been 
presented in the initial motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff even tries to insert the hearsay 
statements borne of our own private investigator}7 efforts. These statements are inadmissable. 
Additionally, pictures not previously produced showing the scene of the accident four years after 
the slip and fall are submitted for "reconsideration," even though the court has never considered 
them. 
Plaintiff now argues that the slip and fall resulted from a design defect, although there is 
not now, nor within the motion was originally presented to the court, any evidence whatsoever 
that any defect that existed was by design or existed because of the way the asphalt was laid. 
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Again, in the plaintiffs own words, it was "broken asphalt." 
Plaintiff also claims that the matter should be reconsidered because defendants have 
failed to respond to discovery. Plaintiff points out that she filed a motion to compel in May of 
2007 and now asks the court to rule on the motion. Because plaintiff could have asked this court 
to rule on the motion to compel long before summary judgement was granted, any plea now to 
re-open this case for further discovery is simply unreasonable. If plaintiff had forgotten that she 
had filed a motion to compel, it was clearly put squarely to her attention when this court in its 
initial memorandum decision denying summary judgment noted that the motion to compel had 
been filed but not ruled upon because no notice to submit ever had been filed with the court. See 
July 2, 2007 Memorandum Decision pg. 2, note 1. Thus, even where the court pointed out that 
all plaintiff needed to do was file a notice to submit two months prior to ruling on this matter, 
plaintiff failed to do so. Accordingly, plaintiffs arguments that defendants have tied her hands 
fail. 
The sum and substance of plaintiff s opposition to the original summary judgment, which 
is now put forth again, is that speculation should rule the day. No material evidence of notice of 
a dangerous condition was brought forth. One thousand patrons crossed the same parking lot 
without complaint daily. Plaintiff herself, both the day before her fall and at the time she fell, did 
not see any defect in the asphalt. Plaintiff claims that notice after the fall, as well as other events 
after the fall, support an inference of notice prior to the fall. This court disagrees. 
Plaintiff is further speculating on how long the condition existed. Plaintiff is asking this 
court to submit the matter to a jury so the jury can speculate both on what caused the plaintiffs 
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fall, and if it was the condition of the parking lot, how long the condition had existed. In Goebel 
the court stated: 
[Not] only will the jury have to speculate about whether [defendant] had notice of the 
dangerous gap in the first place, it would also have to speculate about whether 
[defendant] had notice far enough in advance to repair the gap before [plaintiffs] 
accident. 
Goebel v. Salt Lake City S. R.R. Co., 2004 UT 80 f^ 25. As stated, this court will not submit a 
case of speculation to the jury for determination, since as a matter of law where speculation is 
employed the evidence does not preponderate one way or another. 
Challenge to venue. Plaintiffs challenge to venue in the American Fork department of 
the Fourth District Court is meritless. First, Utah Code Ann. §78-13-10 does not preclude 
transferring this case to the American Fork department.6 The venue provisions of the Utah Code 
provide that an action must be tried in the proper county. American Fork is in the same county as 
Provo. 
Plaintiff claims that the jury pools between Provo and American Fork will differ. There 
is no basis for plaintiffs contention. In fact, the jury pools and how they are selected are 
I 
identical between Provo and American Fork. A single clerk, located in the Provo courthouse, 
compiles the jury pools from within Utah County for all juries in the county, whether located in 
Provo, Spanish Fork, Orem, or American Fork. 
Lastly, a party cannot wait until a final determination of the case and then challenge the 
venue where the case was decided. Plaintiff has simply waived this argument. 
6The case was assigned due to the recusal of the previously assigned judge. 
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PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL IS MOOT 
Because the court finds plaintiffs motion to reconsider to be procedurally defective, and 
because the court does not find a sufficient basis to set aside its previous memorandum decision 
and order, the issue of plaintiff s motion to compel has been rendered moot and is therefore 
denied. 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE 
Defendant's motion to strike is granted. Plaintiff claims this court cannot consider the 
motion to strike unless the court first grants the motion to reconsider. Plaintiff makes this claim 
even though the pictures at issue are appended to the motion to reconsider and form the basis for 
the relief sought. This conclusion is illogical. The point is whether this court should consider 
them or strike them. 
Any materials not previously submitted to the other party prior to the initial motion for 
summary judgment should not be filed with the court. Plaintiff has not explained why she could 
not subpoena the photographs from the individual holding them long prior to the motion foi 
summary judgment. New evidence should only be considered when a properly brought motion 
for new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence is brought before the court. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, plaintiffs motion to reconsider is denied both procedurally 
and upon the merits. Plaintiffs motion to compel is denied as being moot. Defendant's motion 
to strike the photographs submitted with the motion to reconsider is hereby granted. Defendant's 
counsel shall prepare an order consistent with rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Dated this 29th day of November, 2007. 
;\^&^e David N. Mortensen 
ou$|h District Court Judge 
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